Aggregate and cross-sectional analyses on capital structure of Japanese manufacturing corporations. by Chung, Kok-fai. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
1 
I Aggregate and Cross-Sectional Analyses on Capital Structure of 




in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
« for the degree of 





Department of Economics 







. . . . . . � • , . • 
• . , , ‘ • ‘ - ‘ ‘ 
. , . , • . • ‘ , , 




/• , /.二 广厂…"...• ‘ � 
i 2 8 � 1 9 ? ； .:：1 I 夕々 ，. 
\ 
Abstract 
We study the capital structure decisions of the Japanese manufacturing corporations from 
both the aggregate and cross-sectional perspectives. On the aggregate side，we find that 
the Japanese manufacturing corporations have depended heavily on debt and bank loans 
for financing for a long time. Nevertheless，with the advent of financial deregulations 
since the late 1970s in Japan and the increase in the availability of internal funds, the 
Japanese manufacturing corporations have shifted their reliance on bank loans to bond 
issue and internal funding, reflecting in the persistent decline in their aggregate debt ratio. 
On the cross-sectional side， we study econometrically the determinants for the 
heterogeneity in debt-equity choice among the Japanese manufacturing corporations. We 
find that conventional theories of capital structure such as the static tradeoff theory are 
very helpful to us to understand the actual debt-equity choice in Japan. At the same time, 
we also study the heterogeneity in bank loan-bond issue choice among these corporations 
based on the hidden information framework propounded by Mackie-Mason (1990). We 
find that while the hidden information story can explain this choice, there is still a large 
residual yet to be accounted for. It suggests the need for further theoretical work in this 
area. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In a path-breaking paper, Modigliani and Miller (M-M) (1958) has derived a proposition 
which states that under the condition of frictionless capital market, capital structure 
decision is irrelevant to the value or the cost of capital of the firm. This finding is very 
striking to the financial economists and the financial practitioners in the business world 
since it seems hard to be squared with their beliefs and some empirical observations 
suggesting that capital structure should matter. 
One of such observations comes from Japan. If capital structure is really irrelevant, then 
any mix between debt and equity would be equally fine to the firms anywhere so that there 
should not exist any marked and systematic differences in the capital structure of different 
countries. Nevertheless, the figures in Table 1.1，which compares the aggregate equity 
ratio of the Japanese corporations and that of the major industrialized countries, tell us 
that this expectation is not in accord with empirical observation. 
Table 1.1: Comparison of Aggregate Equity Ratio between Japan and Selected 
Western Countries, 1978 - 1990® 
1978 1982 1986 1990 Average 
Japan 0.1990 0.2340 0.2792 0.3140 0.2517 
Germany 0.3517 0.3458 0.3800 0.3861 0.3652 
UK 0.4612 0.4582 0.4895 0.4842 0.4747 
Canada 0.5271 0.5066 0.5287 0.5163 0.5241 
US 0.6587 0.6809 0.5963 0.5310 0.6250 
a Equity ratio is defined as the ratio of equity to total asset. Source: OECD Financial Statistics Part 3: 
Non-financial Enterprises' Financial Statements, various issues. 
It is interesting to find that the differences in equity ratio between the Japanese 
corporations and their western counterparts are marked, ranging from 0.11 (Japan versus 
Germany) to 0.40 (Japan versus the US) on average. Meanwhile, the ratio for Japan is 
consistently the lowest among the major industrialized countries. Equivalently, it means 
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that the Japanese corporations on average seem to have a greater preference for using 
debt than their western counterparts. 
These observations not only suggest that the original M-M proposition cannot be directly 
applied to the real world phenomenon, but also highlight Japan as an unique case in 
capital structure and thus it represents an interesting issue to be investigated. Despite this, 
there have only been a few studies which address the issue of capital structure of the 
Japanese corporations. With respect to the aggregate capital structure, the relatively 
well-known studies are the two papers by Hodder and Tschoegl (1985 & 1991)，the latter 
of which in fact can be regarded as an updated version of the former. Being surveys on 
the salient characteristics of every fimd source such as bank borrowing, equity and bond 
issues，their studies are highly successful in providing the readers with a broad overview 
of the corporate finance in Japan. Nevertheless, the shortcoming of such a broadbrush 
approach is that they fail to document systematically the observed aggregate pattern of 
capital structure of the Japanese corporations as well as to provide explanations for it，the 
issues that we are interested. 
Meanwhile, there is only one study which focuses on the subject from the cross-sectional 
perspective. Nagatani (1985) has conducted an econometric study on the capital structure 
choice of the Japanese manufacturing corporations. In fact his objective is to examine the 
possible differences in various economic behaviours between the firms affiliated with 
industrial groupings (keiretsu) and the non-affiliated firms and debt-equity choice is one of 
the areas under study. However, his study has suffered from at least two drawbacks. 
First, as pointed out by Hadley (1985) and will be explained in more detail in the coming 
chapter, there are doubts in the classification of firms into affiliated and non-affiliated 
firms. It is critical because the estimation results are sensitive to the categorization of 
firms. Second, in the regression equation, there are only three explanatory variables: 
total asset, seven dummies for keiretsu affiliations, and 16 industry dummies. In other 
words, Nagatani has omitted a number of relevant variables suggested by the capital 
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structure literature in the estimated equation (e.g. non-debt tax shield), resulting in 
possible possible bias in the parameter estimates. 
In short, the existing studies on capital structure of the Japanese corporations are far from 
complete and systematic. In view of this, we shall try to contribute to the literature by 
providing a comprehensive and systematic treatment of the subject. Specifically, we shall 
carefully document both the aggregate and cross-sectional patterns of capital structure of 
the Japanese corporations and attempt to provide explanations for the observed patterns. 
In order to narrow the scope, we shall only concentrate on the Japanese manufacturing 
corporations in the present study. 
The organization of this study is as follows: In Chapter 2, we shall review the major 
theoretical and empirical findings in the capital structure literature, which will serve as an 
important basis for studying the observed capital structure pattern in Japan. In Chapter 3， 
we shall take up the issue of aggregate capital structure of the Japanese manufacturing 
corporations. Conceptually it can be divided into two parts: In the first part，we try to 
delineate the major features of the aggregate capital structure of the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations. In the second part, we shall provide institutional and 
theoretical explanations for our observation. Then in Chapter 4, we approach the issue 
from the cross-sectional perspective by analyzing econometrically the interfirm differences 
in capital structure of the Japanese manufacturing corporations. Similar to the Chapter 3， 
we shall first document the pattern of interfirm differences in capital structure and then 
estimate an econometric model to identify the relevant determinants of such differences. 
Apart from the usual debt-equity choice, in this chapter we also study the bond-bank 
loans choice motivated by a similar study by Mackie-Mason (1990) on the US firms. We 
include this into our study because we think that this kind of capital structure choice is as 
important as the conventional debt-equity choice to the financial managers. However, 
there has been no framework in the literature to deal with this choice. The situation is 
changed after the publication of Mackie-Mason's work, which offers a simple framework 
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(which is known as hidden information framework) for analyzing this choice. We shall 
adapt his framework to the case of the Japanese manufacturing corporations. Finally 
Chapter 5 concludes the present study and suggests a number of fiiture research direction. 
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Chapter 2: Corporate Capital Structure Decision: A Review of Theory 
and Evidence 
"All theory depends on assumptions which are not quite true. That is what makes it theory. The art of 
successful theorizing is to make the inevitable simpli^ng assumptions in such a way that the final results 
are not very sensitive. A "crucial" assumption is one on which the conclusions do depend sensitively, 
and it is important that crucial assumptions be reasonably realistic. When the result seems to flow 
specifically from a special crucial assumption, then if the assumption is dubious, the results are suspect." 
(Solow(1956), pp.65). 
A. Introduction 
These statements from Robert Solow clearly convey the message that we need to identify 
the crucial assumption(s) of each theory and make sure that it is (they are) consistent with 
the reality so that the implications of the theory will be of value in explaining empirical 
observations. In fact he had done the job in the modelling of economic growth so well 
that he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1987 for this work. 
Judging from the development of the literature of corporate capital structure decisions 
since the publication of the path-breaking paper of Modigliani and Miller (M-M) in 1958, 
financial economists also seem to be very concerned with the task of identifying and 
modifying the crucial assumptions underlying the original M-M theorem. The ultimate 
motivation is surely to demolish the conclusion of the first proposition of M-M theorem 
that capital structure is irrelevant to the value of the firm, which is too hard to be 
accepted as a good approximation of reality. After the endeavours for some 35 years, the 
literature has accumulated a wealth of findings，both theoretical and empirical, with 
which we are now in a good position to understand the factors governing the corporate 
capital structure choices. 
In this chapter，we are going to review the key findings of this vast literature. The 
discussions will be divided into four parts. The first three parts correspond to each of the 
three major theories of capital structure, namely the static tradeoff theory, the agency 
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theory, and the asymmetric information theory, which are motivated respectively by the 
tradeoff between tax and bankruptcy cost considerations, conflicts of interests among 
managers, shareholders and creditors, as well as the differential access to a firm's private 
information between the insiders and the outside investors. Within each part, we shall 
first delineate the major theoretical arguments in their stripped-down form and then 
present the relevant empirical evidence to see how useful the arguments are in explaining 
observed capital structure choice. 
As we shall see，one of the common features shared by most of these models (except the 
model of Myers and Majluf (1984)) is their postulate that there are essentially two kinds of 
financial instruments available to firms: debt and equity, and thus they fail to provide 
explanations regarding the choice among different types of debts (e.g. bank loans versus 
bond issue) or equity (e.g. internal fiinds versus equity issues). In fact there is no 
framework for dealing with such choices until the publication of the work by Mackie-
Mason (1990). We shall review his work in Section E. Section F will conclude the 
present chapter. 
B. Static Tradeoff Theory 
As hinted by its name, the static tradeoff theory views that the optimal debt policy is 
determined by the tradeoff between the tax benefits and the cost of wasted non-debt tax 
shields as well as the expected bankruptcy costs associated with using debt. In fact the 
theory is the result of relaxations of two major assumptions in the original M-M model, 
namely no tax and no risk of bankruptcy of debt. 
The first step in the modification of original M-M model was taken by M-M themselves 
(1963). In that study, they assume that, unlike in the original model, corporations now 
need to pay corporate income tax. Coupled with the fact that interest payments by a firm 
is tax deductible whereas the distributed income is not, it follows that there is a tax 
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advantage in using debt over equity in financing corporate expenditures and the optimal 
capital structure should be 100% debt. 
Of course the 100% debt conclusion is as controversial as the original irrelevance 
conclusion as we hardly observe any firm which finances all of their assets with debts. 
One of the major points that the above argument overlooks is that by affecting the relative 
effective yields of interest income and dividend income, and hence the supplies of debts 
and equity capital, personal tax rates also matter (Miller (1977)). If personal tax on 
interest income (which is often the same as the ordinary personal income tax rate) is well 
above that on income stream from equity, then it could outweigh the tax shield advantage 
of interest payments such that totally unlevered will be the best policy. Specifically, the 
net tax advantage of debt is captured by the present value of the interest tax shields (PVi), 
which is defined as follows (assume the debt is perpetual at fixed interest rate), 
PVi = (1 - y)B 
where y = [(1 - tc)(l - tps)] / (1 - tpd)}, tc is the corporate income tax, tps and tpd are the 
personal tax rates on equity income and interest income respectively, and B is the amount 
of debt. (1 - y) can be termed as the debt incentive tax ratio which measures the net tax 
advantage of each dollar of corporate debt. Clearly, the debt incentive tax ratio is critical 
to the determination of optimal capital structure by affecting the present value of interest 
tax shield. If (1 - y)>0, then PVi is positive and thus 100% debt will be optimal. On the 
contrary, if (1 - y) < 0, then the optimal policy is 100% equity. Capital structure will be 
indeterminate if(l - y) = 0. 
To test this implication, it is simply to calculate the debt incentive tax ratio and to 
compare the implied value of capital structure with the actual one. Data provided by 
Taggart (1985) is useful to us. He has computed the debt incentive tax ratio in US from 
the late 1910's to 1980 and found the ratio not only positive but also increasing over time. 
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By the above argument, the aggregate debt ratio of the US corporations should be 1 
throughout the period. Nevertheless, the actual ratio was ranged only approximately 
from 0.1 to 0.4, even though there seemed to be a positive association between these 
two series during the postwar period \ Therefore，there must be some counteracting 
forces such that the unlimited appetite for debt finance under taxation effect can be 
checked, and it is precisely how the non-debt tax shields and bankruptcy cost enter the 
picture. 
As allowed by the tax laws in many countries, firms are able to deduct certain types of 
expenses from the gross profit in the calculations of taxable income on top of interest 
payments like the expenses on depreciation as well as research and development. At the 
same time, there may also be various kinds of tax credit granted to firms, such as 
investment tax credit. All the tax savings generated from these expenses and tax credits 
are collectively called non-debt tax shields. The greater the amount of these non-debt tax 
shields, the closer of a firm to the state of tax exhaustion (which refers to the situation in 
which the amount of these expenses is so great that the firm need not pay any tax), and 
thus the tax advantage of debt will reduce or even vanish (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); 
Dotan and Ravid (1985)). This negative relationship between the amount of non-debt tax 
shield and debt usage has been tested by a number of cross-sectional studies. 
Nevertheless, the results are mixed which may be due to the problem of accurately 
measuring the amount of non-debt tax shields. Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984) have 
found the relationship positive and significant. Meanwhile, Long and Malitz (1985) and 
Titman and Wessels (1988) have obtained the expected negative relationship but it is not 
significant. 
Apart from non-debt tax shields, the expected cost of bankruptcy also serves to deter a 
firm from using debt excessively. The more debt a firm uses, the greater interest 
payments will be incurred. As a result, the probability that the operating income is not 
sufficient to cover interest payments, and hence being bankrupt and liquidated, will be 
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increased. The cost of bankruptcy consists of two components: direct cost and indirect 
cost. Direct cost refers to the out-of-the-pocket expenses associated with the legal and 
administrative process of bankruptcy whereas indirect cost is the implicit cost related to 
bankruptcy which can be manifested in several forms. One form is the reduced 
investments and sales. When a firm has financial distress, it may find it difficult to 
convince its creditors to supply more capital even though it has a profitable investment 
project. Meanwhile, customers may no longer buy from a financially-troubled firm for 
fear that the warranty on the product may not be honoured in case the firm is bankrupt. 
Another form of indirect cost of bankruptcy comes from the premium required by 
creditors on their lending due to their perceptions of opportunistic behaviour of managers 
when the firm is at the brink of bankruptcy. Myers (1977) presents an analysis in which 
when a firm has difficulties in making promised payments to creditors, it may have 
incentives to reduce the firm value such as the failure to exploit profitable investment 
opportunities. The greater the debt a firm uses, the greater the incentives for the 
managers to behave opportunistically during financial distress， and the higher the 
premium will be required by the creditors on their lending to the firm. 
Several studies have attempted to estimate the magnitude of these bankruptcy costs. 
Warner (1977) has estimated on average the direct cost of bankruptcy for a number of 
railroad firms in US which were in bankruptcy proceedings during 1933-55 accounted for 
about one percent of their market value prior to bankruptcy. Meanwhile, Weiss (1990) 
has found that such costs were about three percent of market value for a sample of firms 
that had filed for bankruptcy protection in US during 1980 and 1986. As to the indirect 
cost of bankruptcy. Cutler and Summers (1988) have tried to detect these costs in their 
study on the events following Pennzoil successful $10 billion judgement against Texaco 
and Texaco's subsequent attempts to overturn this judgement. It is expected that the 
outcome of the litigation favouring one firm over the other would not affect their 
combined value since they were fighting for a lump-sum transfer. Cutler and Summers, 
however, have found that when the court ruled against Texaco, the combined value of 
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both firms fell more than $3 millions, which was much larger than the administrative costs 
incurred during the dispute. They interpret this loss as an indirect cost of financial 
distress. With $10 billion liability to Pennzoil, Texaco found itself less able to raise 
capital and operate efficiently. 
For firms to care about bankruptcy costs in determining debt policy, the magnitude of 
these costs must be great. However, it is difficult to tell what is meant by "great", and 
thus direct estimations of the magnitude of bankruptcy costs as done by the above studies 
may not be very useful to the examination of debt usage behaviour. In light of this, there 
are other empirical studies which test the implications of the bankruptcy cost argument on 
corporate debt policy. Specifically, they have tested the effects of the following variables, 
1. Firm size: The larger the firms, the more diversified portfolio it can have, and thus 
the lower the bankruptcy risk. Therefore, larger firms are expected to be able to 
support more debt (Smith and Warner (1979)). The results are in general consistent 
with this implication (Friend and Hasbrouck (1988); Crutchley and Hansen (1989)). 
2. Business risk: Since business risk and the risk associated with debt usage decision 
(i.e. financial risk) jointly define the total risk of bankruptcy of a firm, we expect that 
the firms with greater business risk will use less debt to control total risk. The 
direction of the estimated effect is, however, not wholly agreeable to our a priori 
expectation. By using profitability variability as proxy, Gordon (1962) obtains a 
negative relationship even though Ferri and Jones (1979) finds no effect. Auerbach 
(1985) uses two risk variables: variance of firm value, which enters in a negative 
direction, and variance of earnings, which enters positively, even though both of 
them are statistically insignificant. 
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3. Amount of tangible assets: The eventual amount received by creditors when a firm is 
bankrupt and liquidated depends, among other things, on the attributes of the firm's 
asset. One of the important attributes is the tangibility. Tangible assets are of more 
value than the non-tangible assets (such as goodwill) under bankruptcy since the value 
of the latter will dissipate when the firm ceases to be a going concern whereas the 
former will be less so. Therefore, the creditors of a firm with more intangible assets 
will require a higher premium for their lending, which thus discourages the firm's use 
of debt (Myers (1983); Long and Malitz (1985)). In general, this proposition is 
supported by data (Marsh (1982); Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984); Long and Malitz 
(1985). 
C. Agency Theory 
The application of agency theory to the field of finance can be traced to the classic work 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976) which builds on the earlier work by Fama and Miller 
(1972). Jensen and Meckling attempt to examine the impacts of conflicts of interests 
between various parties of a firm, namely the shareholders, creditors, and managers, on 
corporate capital structure decision, a possibility which is not considered by the original 
M-M model. Their central argument is that the optimal capital structure can be regarded 
as the outcome of a tradeoff between the agency cost of equity versus that of debt, which 
in turn arises respectively from the conflicts of interests between the managers and 
shareholders as well as between shareholders and creditors of the firm. In what follows, 
we shall discuss briefly these conflicts in turn and show how they give rise to the optimal 
capital structure. 
The conflict of interests between managers and shareholders arise because the former hold 
less than 100% of residual claims of the firm. Consequently, while they bear the full cost 
of their profit enhancement activities, they can only capture a part of the gains. The cost 
borne by the managers in enhancing the profits of a firm can be manifested in many ways, 
including their efforts put on the job and the forgone perquisites such as corporate jets or 
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plush office. The direct implication is that the managers will only work at the level which 
maximize their net benefits, which is not necessarily congruent with the value-maximizing 
effort as desired by the shareholders. The forgone profits due to "shirking" of managers 
as well as their consumption of firm resources for private use are examples of the agency 
cost of equity. The use of debt can help lower such costs in several ways. First，holding 
the investment of the managers in their firm constant, the more debt is used, the larger 
the equity stakes held by the manager will be which increases their incentives to enhance 
the profits of the firms. Second, as pointed out by Jensen (1986), since debt commits 
cash payments to creditors, it reduces the amount of free cash flow (i.e. the amount of 
cash flow in excess to fiind all projects that have positive net present value (Jensen (1986); 
pp.323) available to managers to be engaged in the consumption of perquisites. All these 
implications point to the conclusion that the more debt a firm uses, the less agency cost of 
equity will be .^ 
Nevertheless, it does not imply that the optimal capital structure should be 100% debt 
since debt per se also gives rise to another kind of agency cost due to the possible 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors. Such conflicts occur because the 
shareholders have incentives to invest suboptimally (from the perspective of firm value) 
when debt is used. Specifically, shareholders are interested in undertaking risky projects 
even though its expected net present value is negative. It is the case because when the 
project succeeds, then the shareholders will gain a lot but if it fails, most of the loss will 
be borne by the creditors under the provision of limited liability. Another possibility is 
that, given the firm borrows at the first place, its shareholders may fail to undertake 
investment projects with positive net present value as most or even all of the cash flow 
will be used to service the senior debts. As creditors are assumed to be aware of these 
incentives of shareholders, they will require premiums on their lending to the firm. Since 
the more debt a firm has, the greater incentives of their shareholders to invest 
suboptimally, creditors will accordingly demand more premiums on their lending. In 
other words, the agency cost associated with the conflicts of interests between the 
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shareholders and creditors will increase with the amount of debt relative to equity. 
Together with the argument of agency cost of equity mentioned above, the optimal 
capital structure can be determined by the tradeoff between the agency cost of equity 
(which is decreasing in debt-equity ratio) and that of the debt (which is increasing in debt-
equity ratio). 
A number of implications flow from this agency cost framework. First, holding other 
things constant, the larger the equity stakes held by the managers, the less debt will need 
to be used to induce the managers to behave in the firm-value-maximizing manner. Friend 
and Hasbrouck (1988) have tested this proposition and found that the relationship is 
negative but significant only in some specifications .^ Second, the greater the amount of 
free cash flow, the more resources available to managers for their own perquisites 
consumption, and thus the more debt will be used. Nevertheless, this implication has 
been rejected by Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990). Third, given the possible conflicts of 
interests between the shareholders and creditors, the latter may have incentives to use 
covenants to restrict the behaviour of shareholders. Such covenants do exist in reality. 
Smith and Warner (1979) have examined actual covenants used by the bondholders in the 
US. They have found that since monitoring is costly but necessary to make sure the 
shareholders to comply with the covenants, the bondholders will tend to adopt the 
covenants that restrict the dividend and financing policies instead of restricting the type of 
production and investment project to be undertaken. It is the case because, while both 
serve to prevent the shareholders from transferring the wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders, the former option entails less monitoring cost since the dividend and 
financing behaviour are readily observable by the bondholders whereas it is difficult and 
very costly to evaluate the optimality of a project by the bondholders. 
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D. Asymmetric Information Theory 
Apart from the considerations of taxation, bankruptcy cost and agency cost，the problem 
of asymmetric information can also affect the choice of corporate capital structure. The 
models that are based on this information problem can be regarded as attempts to relax the 
assumption of perfect information implicit in the perfect capital market assumption in the 
original M-M model. Two main strands of thoughts can be demarcated. The first strand 
can be represented by the work of Ross (1977), which posits that capital structure serves 
as a signal revealing the private information wielded by insiders to outside investors. The 
second strand was initiated by Myers and Majluf (1984), which views that capital 
structure is the result of mitigating the inefficiencies in the firm's investment decisions that 
are caused by the information asymmetry problem. We shall discuss them in turn. 
Signalling Approach to Capital Structure 
Built on the signalling model ofSpence (1974) and Riley (1979)，Ross (1977) formulates 
a model in which the management's choice of the firm's debt-equity ratio acts as a signal 
conveying information to outsiders about the firm's fiiture returns, which are supposed to 
be known by the managers only. Managerial rewards depend on the firm's current and 
future valuation of the firm, with a penalty being levied if the firm goes bankrupt in the 
future. If various restrictions on the parameters of the managerial reward function is 
satisfied, then a signaling equilibrium will exist in which firms with higher expected 
returns will use more debt, so that outside investors can infer the management's inside 
information about the future returns of the firm by observing the debt equity ratio. 
One implication is directly generated from this account of capital structure: debt ratio is 
positively related to future profitability of a firm. Nevertheless, there has been no 
empirical study so far to take up this task, which may be due to the complications 
involved in the estimation of future profitability. Some studies have been conducted to 
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test the relationship between leverage and current profitability of the firms, all of which 
show that the relationship is negative (Friend and Hasbrouck (1988); Titman and Wessels 
(1988)). Despite this, it is not necessary to be a counter evidence to Ross' model since 
current and future profitability is not necessarily related. As we shall see, this negative 
relationship between current profitability and leverage is consistent with one of the 
implications of the model of Myers and Majluf (1984), to which we now turn. 
Interaction between Investment and Capital Structure 
Myers and Majluf (1984) are concerned with how the problem of information asymmetry 
may lead to underinvestment of a firm. Their argument is as follows, which is basically 
applying Akerlofs model to financial and investment problems. Suppose there are only 
two kinds of firms which differ in their asset value only. Investors know this but cannot 
identify which firms have higher asset value. Therefore，their valuations of all firms' 
equity will be identical, which is equal to their average valuation of their claims on income 
from high value firms and that on low value firms. Since the asset value of a firm depends 
on the amount of income it generates, it implies that the equity of the high value firms will 
be underpriced whereas the converse is true for low value firms. Therefore, if both types 
of firms face the same project with positive net present value and if they can only issue 
equity to finance it, then the low value firm will always undertake the project and issue 
new equity since it is overpriced by the investors. As to the high value firms, they will 
take up the project if and only if the loss of firm value due to underpricing by investors is 
smaller than the net present value of the project. When this inequality is reversed, then 
the high value firms will not take up the project, which is the problem of underinvestment 
mentioned above. 
Clearly, asymmetric information between the insiders and outsiders is the key to 
underinvestment of the high value firms noted above. However, if these firms have 
internal fund or access to riskless debt, then the information asymmetry problem will 
vanish and the firm wiU finance the project with these sources of fiinds. This has given 
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rise to the well-documented pecking order theory. It states that in financing investments, 
firms prefer first internal fund or riskless debt to risky debt or new equity issues'*. One of 
the major implications is that if the availability of internal funds increase, then firms will 
use more such funds and reduce their reliance on external finance. Since internal fund is 
one kind of equity capital, this is translated into that the availability of internal funds is 
negatively correlated with leverage. The empirical studies that test the relationship 
between the profitability and debt ratio noted above have confirmed this implication. 
Another major implication of Myers and Majlufs model is that as new equity issue signals 
the issuing firm is very likely a low quality firm, then the announcement of share issue by 
a firm will lower its overvalued share price. This "announcement effect，，has also been 
well-documented by a number of empirical studies, including Asquith and MuUins (1986), 
Masulis and Korwar (1986)，and Mikkelson and Partch (1986). 
E. The Choice of Providers of Finance 
As we have seen, apart from the model of Myers and Majluf (1984), all other models 
presume that firms have only two kinds of financial instruments to be used to financing: 
debt and equity. This presumption, however, has prohibited the financial economists in 
analyzing another type of financing decision which is equally important to the decision of 
debt-equity ratio to the real world financial managers: the choice of providers of 
financing, given the type of instrument. Mackie-Mason (1990) has attempted to set out a 
framework to analyze this choice, which in fact is another version of lemons model of 
Akerlof (1970) and Myers and Majluf (1984). We are going to briefly discuss his 
framework and empirical results. 
Investors' valuations of a claim on a firm's future cash flow depends on their information, 
and hence perception, about the future performance of the firm. Differential access to 
this information of a firm would lead to variations in its valuation among investors. The 
more the information an investor has，the closer of his valuation of a claim to the future 
cash flow of firm to its "true value", and the less lemon premium is required. It is the 
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ultimate assumption on which the empirical study of Mackie-Mason is based. It follows 
that if the investors have more information about the future earnings of Firm A than Firm 
B, then they will require a higher lemon premium on the latter than the former. 
Consequently, Firm B may find that it is not worthwhile to seek finance from the public 
securities market and tend to turn to the private sources: internal funds or bank loans. By 
contrast, since the lemon premium faced by Firm A is lower, it will tend to raise funds 
from the public market. In other words, it is the differential access to firms' private 
information, and hence the relative amount of lemon premiums required by investors, 
which determines the different pattern of private versus public financing decision made by 
different firms. 
Since a priori it is difficult to tell the investors' information about different firms, Mackie-
Mason has used a number of so-called "hidden information indicators" to distinguish the 
firms that have more private information unrevealed to the public investors from those that 
have less in order to test the above proposition. They include the following, 
1. Dividend payment: If dividend payment serves as a signal about the private 
information about the firm, as modelled by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams 
(1985), and Miller and Rock (1985), then investors should possess more information 
about the dividend-paying firms than that of the non-dividend-paying firms. By the 
above argument, dividend-paying firms will tend to use more market sources of 
finance relative to the non-dividend-paying firms. 
2. Forecast variance of earnings: If investors are well-informed about the future 
prospects of a firm, then the error of their forecasted earnings will tend to be small. 
Therefore, if it turns out that the forecasting error is large, then we expect that 
investors are relatively poor-informed about the firm. Mackie-Mason has used the 
standard deviation of the first difference in earnings as the proxy of this forecasting 
variance based on the well-established result that the former is proportional to the 
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latter due to the random walk behaviour of earnings (Watts and Zimberman (1986), 
chapter 6). 
3. Change in stock price: An increase in a firm's stock price may indicate that the 
investors have become convinced of a favourable improvement in the firm's prospects, 
and thus are more likely to believe that firms seek finance for good projects rather than 
bad. The greater the increase, the clearer the signal it is, and thus the less lemon 
premium will be required. 
4. Industries under government rate regulation: If an industry is under the rate regulation 
of government (such as airlines and telephones in US), then the investors of the firms 
belonging to this industry will be better-informed since the regulators are supposed to 
take up the role of information collector and validator for public investors and make 
any bad news about these firms public. Therefore, we expect these firms will use 
more public or market sources of finance. 
5. Tax-loss carryforwards: Under the US tax laws, firms are allowed to cany their loss 
backwards or forwards to decrease their tax payments. If canybackwards is used, 
then the firm will get the immediate refunds. By contrast, if the loss is carryforwards, 
then it is credited against the future income without the accumulation of interest. That 
is why if both options are available to firms, then they will always choose 
canybackwards. If a firm is observed to cany their loss forwards, then it signifies that 
it has been a poor performer in the past few years. Once it is identified as a poor 
performer, then the lemon premium required by investors will be larger compared to 
other firms. 
6. R&D intensity: When a firm is doing a lot of R&D activities, then we can expect that 
its manager will possess more hidden information about the future prospects of the 
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firm than the public investors. As a result, such firm will tend to use less market 
sources of finance but more private sources. 
Based on the incremental financing data of a sample of US firms, Mackie-Mason has 
found that all hidden information indicators but the R&D intensity have the expected signs 
and most of which are statistically significant. These evidences serve to emphasize that 
firms are concerned with both the debt-equity and private-public choices，. 
F. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have gone through a whirlwind tour on the major arguments of capital 
structure literature. Judging from the empirical evidences, it is fair to say that all the 
major theories of debt equity choice, namely static tradeoff theory, agency theory, and 
asymmetric information theory, have bearing on the actual corporate capital structure 
choices. Therefore, in conducting empirical studies on capital structure, it seems 
necessary to take all the considerations of these theories into account so as to achieve a 
more complete explanation. At the same time, the study by Mackie-Mason has furnished 
us with a conceptual framework for understanding the choices between bank loans and 
bond issue as well as between equity issue and internal fund respectively. 
With the basic understanding about the various arguments of capital structure decision, 
we now turn to the analysts of aggregate capital structure choice of the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations. As we shall see, the pecking order hypothesis plays a crucial 
role in explaining the recent declining trend of aggregate debt ratio in Japan. 
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Notes: 
1 One caveat is in order. Taggart (1985) proxies the debt incentive tax ratio by (tc - tp) / 
(1 - tp), which differs from (1 - y) in that the former assumes personal tax rate on equity 
income is zero and substitutes tp for tpd, where tp is the lowest personal income tax rate. 
Without regard to the other higher personal income tax rates and personal income tax rate 
on equity income, the ratio used by Taggart (1985) can only imperfectly gauge the net tax 
advantage of corporate debt. In spite of this, even if we take these factors into account, 
it seems unlikely the debt incentive tax ratio to be zero throughout the period under study 
as required by the tax incentive argument to explain the actual aggregate debt ratio in US. 
2 As suggested by Grossman and Hart (1982), there is another kind of benefit associated 
with using debt. If bankruptcy is costly to managers (perhaps due to the loss of benefits of 
control or reputation), then they will put more efforts on profits enhancements as the 
proportion of debt increases to counteract the increased likelihood of bankruptcy. 
3 Note however that the underlying hypothesis on which the testing of Friend and 
Hasbrouck (1988) is based is not the same as the story depicted in Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)，even though both of them yield the same testable implication. Friend and 
Hasbrouck argue that compared with the shareholders of a firm, the managers in general 
are more risk-averse since their stakes in the firm (namely the equity stakes and human 
capital) are critically contingent upon the firm as a going concern. The portfolio of an 
average shareholder, by contrast, tends to be more diversified. As a result, the managers 
will tend to use a relatively low debt policy as justified by the postulate of firm value 
maximization. It follows that the larger the equity stakes the managers hold, the greater 
loss they will incur if the firm is bankrupt, and the greater incentives for them to decrease 
the debt usage of the firm. 
One of the crucial differences between the hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling and that of 
Friend and Hasbrouck is in the assumption about whose interests are being taken care 
when designing a firm's capital structure. In Jensen and Meckling model, it is the interest 
of shareholders matters whereas in the hypothesis of Friend and Hasbrouck, what matters 
is the managerial interests. In reality, it is common for the managers of a firm to decide 
its capital structure. However, when the interests of managers and shareholders are 
divergent, it seems that it is not likely for the managers to choose a capital structure 
which is not favoured by the shareholders as doing so may mean loss of jobs. Therefore, 
we consider that the hypothesis of Friend and Hasbrouck is less appealing relative to that 
of Jensen and Meckling. 
4 It is different from the modified pecking order, which states the preference ordering of 
firms over alternative sources of funds is as follows: internal fund or riskless debt, risky 
debt, and new equity issue as last resort. In fact the model of Myers and Majluf only 
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implies that only the debt that are not sensitive to the private information is preferred to 
equity (i.e. riskless debt). To transform the original pecking order to the modified, 
additional assumptions are required such as the lognormal distribution of changes in firm 
value (Myers (1984)). 
‘ I t should be noted that the treatment by Mackie-Mason on defining actual financing 
choice the firms in the sample is problematic. He assumes that firms will only make one 
choice of fund source once a year to facilitate the nested-logit estimation of the model. 
However, in general firms will change their uses of more than one fund source within a 
year. To get around this problem, he proceeds as follows: He codes the choice variable 
as "new shares" if the firm issues stock, regardless of other sources of funds; ''bonds" if 
issues bonds; "private debt" if the net increase in debt sources exceeds that of equity (but 
the firm does not issue bonds); "retained earnings" in all other cases (pp.86). Note the 
problem is only got around by arbitrarily defining the choice variable, which is not an 
acceptable procedure. In view of this, we shall not adopt his approach in our study. Our 
approach will be delineated in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3: An Analysis on Aggregate Capital Structure of Japanese 
Manufacturing Corporations 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, we shall document the subject of corporate finance from the aggregative point of 
view. Specifically，we shall delineate the recent trend of aggregate debt usage behaviour of 
Japanese manufacturing corporations and try to figure out the driving forces contributing to this 
trend. The discussions in this chapter not only offers a perspective on the aggregate pattern of 
corporate finance in Japan, but also contains many regulatory and institutional details which will 
be highly usefUl to our study on interfirm financial heterogeneity in the next chapter. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The next section will set the stage for the 
discussions of the whole chapter by documenting the recent trend of aggregate debt usage 
behaviour of the Japanese manufacturing corporations. As we shall see, the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations depended heavily on debt, particularly the loans from financial 
institutions', for financing. Nevertheless�this pattern of heavy debt usage had shown a drastic 
decline since the mid-1970's, which was primarily a reflection of the continued substitution of 
bond issues and internal funds for bank borrowings by the Japanese manufacturing corporations. 
In Section C, we shall explore the reasons for the historical predominance of bank loans over the 
alternative sources of external funds and how it developed into main bank system in Japan. Then 
in Section D, we shall demonstrate the factors leading to the shift of reliance from bank 
borrowings to bond issues and internal funds. As we shall see, various financial deregulations 
beginning at the late 1970，s and the increased availability of internal funds played pivotal roles in 
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bringing about such substitutions. Section E will conclude this chapter. 
B. Setting the Stage 
The most direct method to gauge the aggregate debt usage behaviour is the aggregate debt ratio, 
which is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of all firms under study. Based on 
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the data of OECD Financial Statistics, we have computed the aggregate debt ratio of the 
Japanese manufacturing corporations during 1974 - 1991 and presented the data in Figure 3.1. 
Two observations can readily be noted. First, the usual characterization of heavy debt reliance is 
supported by the data. In fact, the average debt ratio during the period was 0.76，which was 
incredibly high from the perspective of western countries^. Second, while high on average, we 
can witness that the ratio manifested a drastic decline over time. In 1974，debt financed more 
than 80% of asset acquisitions of the Japanese manufacturing corporations. The corresponding 
figure for 1991, nevertheless, was lowered to 68% only. 
Figure 3.1: Aggregate Debt Ratio of Japanese Manufacturing Corporations, 1974 -1991 
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Source: rsprn Financial Statistics Part 3: Non-financial Enterprises，Financial Statements, various issues. 
In order to look at the issue more deeply, we may discern the over time changes of various 
components of the aggregate balance sheet of the Japanese manufacturing corporations. Table 
3.1 shows the major components of this balance sheet over the period 1974- 1991, 
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Table 3.1: Major Components of Aggregate Balance Sheet of Japanese Manufacturing 
Corporations, 1974 -1991' 
1974 1982 1991 1974 - 91 
Liabilities 
-Bank loans 0.40 0.36 0.27 0.36 
-Trade credit 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.21 
-Other accounts 
payables 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 
-Bond 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.03 
Equity 
-Share capital 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 
-Internal reserves 0.13 0.18 0.26 0.19 
a All figures are expressed in percentage of total assets. Source: OECD Financial Statistics Part 3: Non-financial 
Enterprises Financial Statements, various issues. 
The most notable feature about the aggregate balance sheet of the Japanese manufacturing 
corporations was their high degree of reliance on bank loans. On average, these loans accounted 
for 36% of total assets during 1974 - 1991, which were far greater than any source of external 
fund. In fact the predominance of bank loans in Japan could be dated back to the 1950，s3. 
Nevertheless, the importance of bank loans was markedly decreasing over time by more than 13 
percentage points. Concurrent to the persistent decline in the usage of bank loans were the 
increased dependence on bond issues and internal reserves as sources of funds. While 
comparatively unimportant, the proportion of bond in the aggregate balance sheet of the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations showed a great bounce, particularly after 1982. Meanwhile, the 
share of internal reserves also manifested significant increase. During 1974 - 1991, its ratio in 
total assets had doubled from 13% to 26%. 
These observations collectively imply that underlying the continued decline in the aggregate debt 
ratio of the Japanese manufacturing corporations was primarily the enduring substitutions of 
internal funds and bond issues for bank borrowings by these corporations. Therefore, in order to 
understand the long term pattern of aggregate debt ratio, we need to know the reasons 
accounting for such substitutions. Before proceeding to accomplishing this task, we first explore 
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the reasons for the historical predominance of bank loans over the alternative sources of external 
fund in Japan and how it contributed to the emergence of main bank system in Japan. 
� 
C. Historical Predominance of Bank Loans in Japan and the Main Bank System 
The predominance of bank loans in the domain of corporate finance in Japan by and large was a 
regulatory phenomenon. In 1947，the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law 
(FEFTCL) was enacted which forbade all kinds of cross-border financial transactions without the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance. Consequently, not only the foreign investors could not 
access to the Japanese capital markets, but at the same time most of the Japanese corporations 
were not able to raise funds from the overseas markets, and thus resorted to the domestic funds 
only. Nevertheless, there were a number of reasons in Japan (most of which were related to 
regulations) which discouraged the Japanese corporations from using the market sources of funds, 
leading to the observed heavy dependence on bank loans for financing. In what follows，we are 
going to spell out what these reasons are. 
Let us begin with the impediments to bond issues. A key factor that discouraged the Japanese 
corporations from using bonds was the government control over the bond interest rate. In fact in 
issuing corporate bonds，their coupon rates were required to be linked to those of long term 
government bonds which were deliberately controlled at low level in order to lessen the interest 
obligations. If the interest rate for corporate bonds was not controlled, then it might end up with 
the situation that there would be no demand for government bonds. Therefore, in order to secure 
funds at low interest cost, the Japanese government controlled the interest rates of corporate 
bonds, which were the closest substitutes for government bonds' As a result, corporate bonds 
were not attractive to the general investors (Hodder and Tschoegl (1985); Ballon and Tomita 
(1988)). It could be seen from the fact that over 1965 - 1970，bonds accounted for only about 
5.7% of total financial asset of the personal sector^. 
While unattractive to investors, bond issue in the domestic market was also not appealing to the 
corporations due to the cost and cumbersome procedure for bond issuance. As to the issuing 
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cost, not only the issuing firms had to pay the management fees and underwriting commissions, 
but also the services charges imposed by the trustee. Meanwhile, the issuing corporations had to 
gain approval from a committee dominated by a group of large banks (Kisaikaf) on the matters 
concerning the timing, volume, type, and the terms of issues. In other words, the banks were 
endowed with enormous powers to controlling the access to bond market by the Japanese 
corporations. Since bank loans and bonds were close substitutes, thus these banks had set the 
strict terms to discourage the Japanese corporations to issue bonds (Rosembluth (1989)). 
Moreover, since corporate bonds were discountable at the Bank of Japan, the authorities had 
great incentive to ensure the quality of the corporate bonds. In fact，the Bank of Japan and the 
Ministry of Finance monitored and occasionally exercised control over the selection of 
corporations qualified to issue bonds，the issuing terms, and even the total monthly amount of 
new issues (Goto (1980)). 
Another factor which might also affect the effective cost of bond issue was the collateral 
requirement. Prior to 1979，all corporate bond issues were required to be backed up by 
.collaterals^. The most common types of collateral were fixed assets such as factories and 
equipments of the firm (Suzuki (1990)). Thus the effect of collateral requirements fell more on 
the non-manufacturing firms than the manufacturing firms since the former tended to have less 
fixed assets to be pledged. Nevertheless, not all bank loans were secured. For example, in 
1978，32% of loans and discounts granted by the banks in Japan were unsecured 
The last regulatory constraint comes from Commercial Code (article 297)，which explicitly 
stipulates that the outstanding bond amount of any corporation cannot exceed its equity capital 
This regulation was an effective constraint on the Japanese corporations in issuing bonds since, as 
we have seen in Section B, they relied heavily on debt for financing. In other words, their base 
of equity capital was so thin that they were not able to issue much bonds. 
Similar to the bond issues, the Japanese corporations did not rely much on stock issues as a 
source of fund. One major factor accounting for this was the traditional practice of share issue 
and dividend payment at par. Before 1969, all share issues were made at par (the par value of the 
26 
t 
stock of most of the Japanese corporations was 50 yen per share). Moreover, there was an 
implicit rule (in fact an explicate rule to the corporations listed in the First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange) that the dividend payment should be 10% of the par value of the stock. 
Consequently, the dividend cost of share issues was expensive to the corporations，and thus 
discouraged them from heavily using them for financing (Hodder and Tschoegl (1993)). 
These impediments，together with the fact that most of the financial assets of personal sector was 
placed as deposits in banks^ made the Japanese virtually no alternatives but to turn to banks for 
investment fiinds to satisfy their enormous appetite for external funds to finance the postwar 
economic growth. Consequently, keeping close ties with major banks was important to the 
Japanese corporations, particularly during the period of credit tightness. This corporate need for 
stable source of credit supply had contributed to the rise of main bank system in Japan. Typically, 
as to a corporation, its main bank is its largest creditor as well as one of its largest shareholders 
(Sheard (1989))^. The most elaborate form of such main bank system is manifested in industrial 
groupings, or keiretsu in Japanese^'. There are the six major keiretsu in Japan, including 
Mitsubishi Group, Mitsui Group, Sumitomo Group, Daiichi Kangyo Group, Fuyo Group, and 
Sanwa Group. The first three groupings have zaibatsu as their predecessors in the prewar era 
whereas the latter three were formed in the postwar era with the following city banks as their 
nucleus: Daiichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank, and Sanwa Bank. 
Apart from the lending and shareholding relationships, another major trait characterizing the 
relationship between a corporation and its main bank is the extensive information flow. This is 
achieved through two channels: director linkage and regular meetings of present councils. Main 
bank as a rule sends their staff to the affiliated firms to act as their directors. For example, in 
1980 about half of the listed firms that had bank borrowings had at least one representative on 
their board from their main banks. Meanwhile, each of the major keiretsu has a regular forum at 
which the top-level executives of the core member firms meet. While these president councils 
have no decision power，they do provide another means through which the main banks can gather 
the key information about the core member firms. 
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In fact the arrangements of director linkage and the regular meetings of president councils would 
mean that the member firms of keiretsu will have to disclose their private information to their 
main banks. Why they are willing to do so? One justification is that it is the price to be paid in 
exchange for the continued supply of credit during tight credit condition. However, the model of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) shows that firms may also be rationed out from the credit market 
irrespective to the aggregate credit supply condition. They argue that credit rationing may 
emerge as the profit-maximizing, and hence equilibrium situation under the condition of imperfect 
knowledge of lenders about quality of the borrowers As a result, a portion of borrowing firms 
will be rationed out from the market even though they are willing to pay for the level of interest 
rate which is higher than the one set by the lenders. It follows that in order to get rid of the 
possibility of being rationed out，it may pay for the firms to develop close ties with the banks and 
disclose their private information to them^V 
Another salient feature about the main bank system, which is also a benefit to the keiretsu firms， 
is that when the member firms are in financial distress, their main banks will intervene and rescue 
them. The measures taken are varied case by case, ranging from reducing the amount of interest 
payment to reorganizing the firms by the replacing the existing management with the bank 
personnel or by arranging mergers with other firms 
One of the notable examples of such rescue operations is the case of Mazda during the mid 
1970，s. After the first oil crisis in 1973，the profitability of auto makers in Japan plummeted. It 
was especially the case for Mazda since its new rotary engine was not as fuel-efficient as 
traditional engines. The Sumitomo Bank, the main bank of Mazda, implemented a rescue 
operation: it provided new and cheap loans, sent several executives to improve management, 
and encouraged the firm to sell the shares in the bank. Other Sumitomo Group firms also joined 
the operation. Sumitomo Trust sent its employees as part of a new management team. Sumitomo 
Corporation, the general trading company of the group, helped to market the vehicles produced 
by Mazda. As a result of these efforts, Mazda recovered quickly and subsequently became a 
profitable firm^^. 
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Also interesting is the fact that, in cases of bankruptcy or major reorganization, the main bank 
typically absorbs the loan losses which are greater than its share (Sheard (1989). A case in point 
was Ataka & Co. which failed in 1975. Being the firm's main bank, Sumitomo Bank took up 
59% of company losses，even though at that time it provided only about 15% of loan of the failed 
firm. 
In view of these observed behaviour of main banks, it is natural to ask what is the rationale for 
such actions. Sheard (1989) has argued that it is consistent with the hypothesis of delegated 
monitoring pioneered by Diamond (1984). It makes sense for a single party to take up the 
monitoring task for the others in order avoid duplication of efforts. Within the context of main 
bank system, the firms' non-main-bank creditors simply delegate the task of monitoring to their 
main banks due to their ability to access the private information about the firms. When these 
firms fail, it may reflect the shirking on the part of their main banks. Then the rescue operations 
of main banks or their taking up larger share of loan losses are the costs incurred for their 
shirkingi4 
D. Substitutions of Bond Issues and Internal Fund for Bank Borrowings 
We have seen that the aggregate debt ratio of the Japanese manufacturing corporations had 
persistently been decreasing over time, which mainly reflected the continued shifting of reliance 
from bank borrowings to bond issues and internal funds. Also we have explained the factors 
accounting for the predominance of bank loans over alternative sources of external fund and the 
formation of main bank system. Now we are in the position to explore the causes of the 
substitutions of bond issue and internal funds for bank borrowings in financing corporate 
investments, which were in fact the results of financial deregulations and increased availability of 
internal funds respectively. We shall discuss them in turn. 
Financial Deregulations and the Increased Dependence on Bond Issue 
As mentioned before, financial regulation was a key factor explaining the disincentive of the 
Japanese corporations to use bonds. Therefore, it should not be astonishing to find that it was a 
series of deregulation in bond markets since the late 1970’s which had led the Japanese 
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corporations to use more bonds Table 3.5 shows the major regulatory changes that pertain to the 
corporate finance in Japan. The first major deregulatory move was the enactment of Temporary 
Measures on Limit of Bond Issue in 1977 which raised the limit of outstanding bond amount to 
twice the amount of equity capital. Then in 1978, medium term government bonds were offered 
through public auctions. Effectively，it signified the beginning of the deregulation of bond 
interest rate. Soon after this move, the interest rate on corporate bonds was also deregulated for 
fear of destroying the demand for corporate bonds after the liberalization of government bond 
marketi5. 
Table 3.5: Major Regulatory Changes Pertaining to Corporate Finance" 
• Enactment of Temporary Measures on Limit of Bond Issue which doubled the allowable limit 
of outstanding bonds (1977). 
• Sales of medium term Government bonds through public auctions (1978). 
• Revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law became effective which in 
principle liberalized all kinds of financial transactions with non-residents (1980). 
• Corporations were allowed to issue warrant bonds (1981). 
• Government phased in new regulations for issuing unsecured bonds (1983). 
• Residents were allowed to float Euroyen convertible bonds (1985). 
• Residents were allowed to issue Euroyen straight bonds (1985). 
• Domestic commercial paper market was established (1987). 
a Figures in parentheses denote the year in which the regulatory change took place. Sources: Ballon and Tomita 
(1988); Suzuki (1990); Tatewaki (1991); Hodder and Tschoegl (1993); Yamamoto (1993). 
Another major regulatory change was the revision ofFEFTCL in 1979，which was formally in 
effect in 1980. From then on, all the Japanese corporations in principle were allowed to raise 
funds from the overseas markets. The direct consequence of this relaxation was the expansion of 
offshore bond issues vis-a-vis domestic bond issues, as shown in Table 3.3 as Mows, 
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Table 3.3: Offshore Bond Issues by the Japanese Corporations® 
Issue amount (billion yen) % of total bond issue 
1975 - 9 2,813 25% 
1980-4 7,841 48% 
1985-9 29,869 51% 
a Total bond issue = domestic bond issue + offshore bond issue. Source: Hodder and Tschoegl (1993). 
We can see that before the revision of FEFTCL，offshore bond issues accounted for only around 
one quarter of the total bond issues. But with the liberalization of cross-border transactions, 
offshore bond issues became popular among the Japanese corporations. Further momentum was 
gained from the relaxations of the restriction against Euroyen convertible and straight bond issues 
in April and November 1985 respectively. Consequently, the amount of offshore bond issue 
bounced significantly during 1985 - 9 and its share became slightly more than the domestic bond 
issue. In fact the jump in the offshore bond issue vis-a-vis domestic bond issue might simply 
reflect the relative high issuing cost in the domestic market. Indeed the Ministry of Finance had 
estimated that the difference was roughly 50 basis points in 1990 (OECD Economic Survey 
(1989-90)，pp.100). The gap was presumably even larger during the earlier years. This finding, 
together with the fact that a very large portion of offshore issues by the Japanese corporations 
were wound up in Japanese investors, provided a strong signal that the domestic market was 
inefficient (Hodder and Tschoegl (1993)). 
Also important was the allowance of issuing unsecured bonds in 1983，even though the pace was 
slow. Before 1983, there were only two companies (Toyota Motors and Matsushita Electric) 
that were allowed to issue unsecured bonds in securities. Then in January 1983，an additional 9 
and 23 firms were allowed to issue unsecured convertible and straight bonds respectively. In 
several stages over the subsequent years, these privileges were expanded gradually. By February 
1987，180 firms could issue unsecured straight bonds, and 330 firms could issue unsecured 
convertible bonds (Hoshi et al. (1989)). 
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A T^ithout doubt these deregulation measures had allowed the Japanese corporations to diversify 
their fund procurements. Specifically, these regulatory changes had opened the door for the 
Japanese corporations to shift their reliance from bank borrowings to bond issues. But why it was 
in their interests to do so? To answer this question，we may discern the relative cost of these two 
sources of funds. Figure 3.2 shows the relative levels of interest rate for long term bank loan (as 
measured by the average contracted loan rate) and the market yield of corporate bond during 
1983 - 91. It is clear from the graph that except for 1989, the interest rate for corporate bond 
was consistently lower than the that on the long term bank loan. Thus using bonds seemed to be 
preferred to bank loans for financing from the consideration of interest cost. 
Figure 3.2: Interest Rate on Bank Loan versus Corporate Bond Yield，1983 - 1991 
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Moreover, the figures for the interest rate for bank loan did not represent its total interest cost 
due to the existence of the practice called compensating balance in Japan. When a firm make a 
loan from a bank, it is required to set aside a portion of its loan as time deposit with the bank 
(which is the compensating balance). With this requirement, the lending bank can effectively earn 
a higher interest rate from the same amount of loan at the expense of the borrowing firm''. If we 
also take this factor into consideration, the interest cost from borrowing from banks is even 
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higher than that of bond issue，which helps explain the reason why the Japanese corporations had 
incentive to substitute bond issue for bank borrowings. 
Increase in Availability of Internal Fund 
Bond issue aside, the Japanese manufacturing corporations were also seen to rely more on 
internal reserves for financing, which was the result of the increase in the availability of internal 
fund in accordance with the pecking order hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, firms prefer using 
internal fund to external fund due to the former has a cost advantage over the latter under the 
condition of asymmetric information. It follows that as more internal fund is available, the firm 
will use more internal fund for financing. As a result，its proportion in the capital structure of the 
firm will increase at the expense of the external fiind. 
To gauge the availability of internal fund, we divide the annual flow of internal fund (which 
includes depreciation expenses and retained earnings) of all Japanese manufacturing corporations 
by their total asset. The figures are plotted in Figure 3.3. At the same time, we also plot the 
ratios of depreciation expenses as well as retained earnings to total assets in the graph. 
It is immediately clear that albeit fluctuations，there manifested an increasing long term trend of 
the availability of internal fund over time. The two components of the internal funds, 
depreciation expenses and retained earnings, accounted for 70% and 30% respectively and it was 
the latter which caused the observed fluctuation of internal funds. In other words，depreciation 
expenses had been the major and stable source of internal fund available to the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations^'. Since these expenses were the funds for financing the wearing out 
of physical asset, this sizeable amount of depreciation charges per se reflected the enormous 
investments in physical assets, which have long been regarded as one of the main reasons for the 
postwar hypergrowth of Japan. 
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Figure 3.3: Availability of Internal Fund, 1974 - 1991 
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Source: QECD Financial Statistics Part 3: Non-financial Enterprises' Financial Statements, various issues. 
Our data in Section B suggests that the Japanese manufacturing corporations seemed to prefer 
accumulating internal reserves instead of issuing new shares in building up the base of equity 
capital. One of the reasons was the cost advantage of internal fund as explained above. Another 
major reason was related to the special requirement on new issue. As noted in the last section, all 
I new issues were priced at the par value of the stock before 1969. But with the reorganization of 
the stock market and the consent of the underwriters, shares were allowed to be issued at market 
price instead of par value''. But at the same time, a new requirement was imposed which stated 
that a portion of the premium between the issue price and the par value of the stock had to be 
returned to the shareholders in the form of subsequent gratis share issues, or stock dividend. 
Coupled with the committed payment of dividend at par, under this requirement the dividend cost 
of new issue was not decreased with the practice of market price issue 
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E. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have documented the recent trend of debt usage behaviour of the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations. We have seen that the Japanese manufacturing corporations were 
heavily dependent on debt for financing. Moreover, primarily due to the government regulations 
which restricted the corporate access to domestic and overseas capital markets, most of these 
debts were derived from banks. Nevertheless, this pattern of heavy debt or bank loan reliance 
had changed, especially since the late 1970，s. Financial deregulations took place which allowed 
the Japanese manufacturing corporations to use more less costly bonds for financing. At the same 
time，the increased availability of internal fund over time had also induced the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations to substitute internal funding for bank loans. The overall effect of 
these changes was not only the persistent reduction of reliance on bank loans but also debt ratio. 
The analysis in this chapter provides the picture of the capital structure changes of a 
representative manufacturing corporation in Japan. Nevertheless, behind this representative 
portrait, there exists a great diversity in the observed capital structure choices among the 
Japanese manufacturing corporations. We shall take up the issue of interfirm financial 





1 For the reason of clarity, we shall use the term "banks" to denote "financial institutions" 
throughout this chapter. 
2 Caution has to be exercised in directly comparing the aggregate balance sheet ratios between 
Japan and the other countries due to the difference in accounting practice, namely in the 
tieatment of reserves and piovisions (Elston (19S0); Suzuki and Wright (19S5); Hodder and 
Tschoegl (1993)). The Japanese corporations are allowed by tax law to draw a portion of their 
retained earnings as various types of tax-deductible reserves and provisions for various reasons 
such as reserves for price fluctuations, provisions for bonus payments and overseas market 
developments. While such reserves and provisions are treated as owner's equity in western 
countries, they are posted as liabilities in Japan (Suzuki and Wright (1985)). As a result, the 
aggregate debt ratio of Japan is not comparable to that of the other countries before making 
appropriate data adjustments. 
3 The following table shows the various sources of supply of industrial funds during 1951 - 1970 
(% of total), 
Average Over 
1951-60 1961-70 
Bank loans 46.7 44.8 
Bonds 2.5 1.8 
Shares 8.1 4.8 
Internally generated funds 42.7 48.6 
(Source: Ballon and Tomita (1988), pp.85) 
] . 
i 
We can see that bank loans dominated all sources of funds during 1951-60. However，its ratio 
was less than that of internally generated funds by about 4 percentage points during 1961-70. 
Note that the figures presented in this table refer to Xh f^lcfw of funds. Therefore, they cannot be 
compared to those shown in Table 3.1 which are stock figures. 
4 One may query that if the interest rates on government bond were kept low, then it would also 
be unattractive to the investors. Then who would be willing to purchase these issues? To answer 
this question, one needs to know the issuance procedure of government bonds. Prior to 1989， 
the government bonds were issued under the syndicated underwriting system, under which the 
syndicated members (including almost all the financial institutions in Japan) would purchase the 
unsold amount of government bonds after public offering. Therefore，even though these bonds 
were not attractive to general investors, there still existed a group of "stable customers": the 
banks in Japan. 
5 Source: Suzuki (1990), pp. 28. 
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6 Before the First World War, most of bonds issued in Japan were of unsecured type. However, 
after the financial crises and chronic stagnation after returning to the gold standard, the number 
of defaults grew drastically. In view of this, there was a "clean up the bond market" movement 
undertaken, which resulted in the agreement made by a group of major banks, insurance 
companies and trust companies in 1933 (which made up the bond underwriters in Japan) that all 
corporate bond issues had to be collateralized and include provisions for sinking funds. But in 
1979, there were two companies, Toyota Motors and Matsushita Electric, which were allowed 
to issue unsecured bonds domestically. 
7 Source: Economic Statistics Annual. 1993 issue. 
8 The following table shows the proportion of deposits in the financial assets of personal sector， 





(Source: Suzuki (1990), pp.28) 
9 In 1980，for the firms listed in the First Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange that had borrowings 
from the banks, their main banks on average provided 25% of their total bank loans. Meanwhile, 
there were 72% of these firms with their main banks as one of the top five shareholders. 
10 “kei” and “retsu” stand for "lineage, faction or group" and "arranged in order" respectively 
(Hadley (1970), pp.257). Taken together, keiretsu means the well-organized groupings. In 
Japan, keiretsu can be used to refer two types of groupings. The first type (which may be called 
financial keiretsu), is formed from the firms belonging to different industries. The adjective 
"financial" is to emphasize the prominence of banks in these groupings. The second type of 
grouping (which may be called production keiretsu) is formed by a cluster of vertically-related 
firms such as the manufacturer and retailer of the same product. In this chapter, we shall be 
exclusively concerned with the financial keiretsu. 
u One of the implications of this argument is that other things being constant, the keiretsu firms 
will face a higher level of interest rate than the non-affiliated firms. It sounds as a big contrast to 
the usual characterization that the keiretsu firms can borrow from their main banks at preferential 
term. So far no study has been addressed to this proposition. A closer finding has been noted by 
Caves and Uekusa (1976). They have found that keiretsu firms tend to incur greater interest 
payments than the non-affiliated firms. Nevertheless, without the knowledge of loan amount, we 
cannot tell whether the keiretsu firms face a higher interest rate than the non-affiliated firms. 
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12 Suzuki and Wright (1985) have found that，compared with non-affiliated firms, it is more 
likely for keiretsu firms to file for reorganization rather than liquidation during financial distress. 
Hoshi et al (1990) have also found affiliations with keiretsu help reduce the cost of financial 
distress. 
For more details about this operation, readers may consult Pascale and Rohlen (1983). For 
the details of other similar operations, refer to Sheard (1989). 
14 Note however that Sheard does not make clear why the main bank is willing to take up 
monitoring task for the other creditors. In the case of emergence of financial intermediaries, they 
are willing to take up the task for the depositors because the latter will pay a service fee to the 
former in the form of lower interest rate received. Nevertheless, we cannot figure out how the 
other creditors compensate the main bank (if any) to perform monitoring for them. 
In fact it was the result of banks' pressures to decontrol the government interest rate. As 
mentioned above，banks were obliged to take up all unsold portion of government bond issues. 
Under the condition of controlled bond interest rate, it implied that most of the government 
bonds were purchased by banks. Prior to the first oil crisis, Japan experienced hypergrowth. Tax 
revenues were generally sufficient to meet the government expenditures so that the amount of 
government bond issue was small Therefore，banks were still able to absorb them. However, 
after the first oil crisis, the Japanese economy slowed down, leading to the dramatic increase in 
the government bonds for financing the deficits (See the following table). 





(Source: Economic Statistics Annual. 1993 issue) 
As the enormous increase in government bond issues implied that the banks had to take up more 
low-yield assets, they thus pressured the Japanese government to deregulate the government 
bond market. 
16 The following hypothetical example serves to illustrate this point. Let us make the following 
denotations, 
L: Desired loan amount of a firm (assume to be predetermined), 
r: Annualized interest rate on loans 
i： Annualized interest rate on compensating balance (assume r > i) 
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8： Compensating balance ratio (i.e. the fraction of loans to be set aside as compensating balance) 
Without the requirement of compensating balance, the firm will borrow L and incur the interest 
expense ofrL. But with this requirement，the firm will borrow more than the amount it desires. 
Specifically，the actual loan amount B is determined as follows, 
L = B^8B 
or equivalently B = L / (1 - 6) (Suppose the firm knows 8 before making the loans). The amount 
of 6B is the compensating balance which will give i8B interest income to the firm. As a result, 
the net interest cost of the firm (C) will be, 
C = rB- i8B 
= B(r-i6) 
= L( r - i5 ) / ( l -6 ) 
The last result is based on the fact that B = L / (1 - 6). Dividing both sides by L，we can obtain 
the express of effective loan rate faced by the firm under the practice of compensating balance (C 
/ L), which is equal to (r - i6) / (1 - 5). Partially differentiating (C / L) with respect to 8 we have， 
(r - i) / (1 - df > 0 (since r > i by assumption) 
In other words, the effective loan rate faced by a firm increases with 8. The intuition behind this 
result is that total interest cost incurred by a firm for borrowing a loan under the requirement of 
compensating balance can conceptually be divided into two parts: the interest expense on the 
desired amount of loan (rL) and that on the undesired loan 6B (r • i). The increase in the 
compensating balance ratio will raise the interest expense on undesired loan, which in turn will 
translate into higher total interest expenses of a loan. Given the desired loan amount is constant, 
it implies the effective loan rate (which is defined as the ratio of total interest expenses to the 
desired or effective loan amount) will increase with 8. 
As to the lending bank, it is obviously better off under the practice of compensating balance 
because it not only capture a higher return from the above firm, but also enjoy additional payoffs 
by lending the "forced deposits" to another firm. Suppose it does not require compensating 
balance on the latter firm (as we shall see，it is an innocuous assumption because its relaxation 
will only reinforce our conclusion), then the yield to the total amount loaned out will be, 
(Y/B) = [(rB - i6B) + rSB] /B 
where Y is the total interest income received from lending out B. It is composed of the net 
interest income earned from the first firm (rB - i6B) and the interest income received from lending 
to the second firm (r6B). After rearranging terms, we have (Y / B) = r + 8(r - i). Thus it is 
evident that the greater the compensating balance ratio, the greater the yield to the bank. 
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If we allow the bank to apply compensating balance indiscriminately (i.e. apply the practice to all 
borrowing firms at the same 8), then the expression for the yield on lending out B will be, 
(Y / B) = [(rB - i5B) + (r8B - _ + (r8^B - i8^B) + ……]/ B 
= r + 6(r-i) + 6 V - i ) + 5 \ r - i ) + …… 
= r + (r-i)(8 + 6^  + 5' + ……) 
= r + [5(r - i)]/(I - 8) 
which is evidently greater than the yield under the unrealistic case that compensating balance is 
only required on the first firm but not the others. 
Clearly, the practice of compensating balance is a means used by banks to increase loan yields at 
the expense of borrowing firms. A question then arises, why are the firms willing to submit to 
the banks? As we have seen, market sources of funds had long been either too costly or even 
inaccessible to the Japanese firms. As a result, bank loans were almost the only source of 
external funds. So long as the cost of bank loans was not that high to make the net present value 
of an investment project negative，firms were still willing to borrow from the banks even under 
the practice of compensating balance. But with a series of deregulations mentioned above, the 
Japanese corporations had much more alternatives than before. As a result, the use of 
compensating balance was decreasing in Japan (Hodder and Tschoegl (1993)). 
The proportions of internal fund and its components, depreciation and retained earnings, to 
total assets are shown as follows， 
Internal Fund Depreciation Retained Earning 
1974 5.10% 3.46% 164% 
1975 3.77% 3.20% 0.57% 
1976 4.05% 3.14% 0.58% 
1977 4.01% 3.10% 0.76% 
1978 4.43% 3.19% 1.06% 
1979 5.36% 3.13% 2.00% 
1980 5.06% 3.19% 1.74% 
1981 4.54% 3.26% 1.08% 
1982 4.09% 3.41% 0.63% 
1983 4.34% 3.37% 0.82% 
1984 5.01% 3.50% 1.29% 
1985 5.21% 3.57% 1.34% 
1986 4.50% 3.69% 0.83% 
1987 5.24% 3.64% 1.29% 
1988 5.49% 3.59% 1.85% 
1989 5.41% 3.42% 188% 
1990 5.18% 3.44% 175% 
1991 4.95% 3.64% 124% 
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Average 4.76% 3.39% 1.24% 
Std. Dev. 0.53% 0.19% 0.48% 
Two observations are readily made: First, depreciation was a much more important source of 
internal fund than retained earnings. The former accounted for 71.2% of total internal fund 
available. Second, retained earning was much more volatile than depreciation. Its standard 
deviation was 2.5 times of depreciation. 
The first company that issued new shares at market price was Nihon Gakki, a musical 
instrument maker. 
19 The percentage of the difference between the issue price and the par value of the stock to be 
returned to the shareholders was 20% (Hodder and Tschoegl (1985), pp.77). 
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Chapter 4: Determinants of Financial Heterogeneity among the 
Japanese Manufacturing Corporations: An Econometric Analysis 
A. Introduction 
One of the striking points about the aggregate capital structure of the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations is their heavy dependence on debt. As we have seen, their 
average debt was 0.76 during 1974 - 1991, which was very high by western standard. 
Nevertheless, underlying this aggregate phenomenon is a great diversity in financing 
practices among Japanese corporations. At one extreme, there exists some firms such as 
Sumitomo Light Metal Industries (a leading aluminium roller in Japan), that fund more 
than 90% of their assets acquisitions with debt. At the other extreme, nevertheless, we 
can witness many cash-rich firms such as Toyota Motor Corporation and Hitachi Ltd., 
which not only do not depend much on debt (indeed Toyota has zero borrowings from 
banks), but also have sizeable amount of surplus fond for lending to other parties^. In 
between are the firms with varying degrees of debt dependence. 
Apart from differences in the practice of debt usage，Japanese corporations are also highly 
heterogeneous in the mix of various types of debts. Hodogaya Chemical, a chemical firm 
specializing in producing dyestuffs and industrial chemicals, borrows more than 70% of 
its total debt requirement from banks but issues no bonds. By contrast, the amount of 
bonds issued by Toda Kogyo, another chemical firm which leads in the manufacturing of 
magnetic iron oxide in Japan, accounts for more than 85% of its total debt outstanding. 
The firm has no request for loans from banks. 
In light of these observations, one is tempted to ask: What are the pertinent factors 
determining the interflrm differences in debt usage or the mix of various kinds of debt in 
Japanl In this chapter we shall try to answer this question. Since the question is an 
empirical one, we shall resort to the econometric tools to explore the relevant 
determinants of interflrm financial differences in Japan, based on the insights from a 
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number of corporate finance studies as well as the company-level data of a sample of 
Japanese manufacturing corporations listed in the First Section of Tokyo Stock 
Exchange^. With respect to the mix of various kinds of debt, we shall concentrate on the 
choice between bank loan and bond issue since they are the most important kinds of long 
term debt for financing investment projects in Japan. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In the next section，we shall look at the 
issue of heterogeneity of financial practices among Japanese manufacturing corporations in 
a greater depth with the aid of summary statistics and graphs. In Section C, we shall 
delineate the various arguments put forward by the corporate finance literature as well as 
their empirical counterparts used for econometric estimation. Section D describes the 
sources of data and the estimation technique to be employed in this chapter. In Section E 
we shall present the findings of the estimations and discuss their implications. Then the 
last section will conclude the present chapter. 
B. Statistical Evidence of Financial Heterogeneity of Japanese Manufacturing 
Corporations 
To put ourselves into perspective and to supplement the piecemeal "evidences" shown in 
the previous section, we have prepared some summary statistics and graphs to illustrate 
the financial heterogeneity among Japanese manufacturing corporations. Table 4.1 shows 
the mean (figures in the first row of each item) and the coefficient of variations (CV; 
bracketed figures in the second row of each item) of debt ratio as well as various liability 
ratios during the period 1982 - 1991. The calculations of these figures are based on the 
data of our sample which consists of the manufacturing corporations listed in the First 
Section of Toyko Stock Exchange. Details of the sample will be depicted in Section D. 
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Table 4.1: Heterogeneity of Debt Ratio and its Major Components among the 
Japanese Manufacturing Corporations, 1982 -1991® 
1982 1985 1988 1991 1982-91 
Debt 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.57 
(0.36) (0.35) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34) 
Bank loan 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.21 
(0.74) (0.83) (0.91) (0.82) (0.85) 
Bond 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.07 
(1.39) (1.16) (0.96) (0.78) (1.06) 
Ratio of long term 0.74 0.55 0.42 0.37 0.52 
bank loan to long (0.45) (0.75) (0.96) (0.99) (0.79) 
long term debt 
a The calculations of the figures are based on the data of our sample. The first and the second row 
(bracketed figures) of each item represents respectively the mean and coefficient of variation of the item 
among all firms in a particular year. Except for the ratio of long term bank loan to long term debt, all 
items are e^essed in proportion of total assets. 
Several familiar observations pertaining to the mean levels can readily be noted. First, 
debt ratio was decreasing over time. In 1982, debt financed more than 60% of asset 
acquisitions by Japanese manufacturing corporations. Nevertheless, it fell steadily to 58% 
in 1985 and then to 55% in 1991. Second, the ratio for bank loan also followed the 
general downward trend of debt ratio，even though it was still the most significant liability 
component throughout the whole period. Third, exactly contrary to the case of bank 
loan，the ratio for bond issue was increasing from modestly more than 3% in 1982 to 12% 
in 1991. Fourth, as reflected by the plummeting ratio of long term bank loan to long term 
debt (which is defined as the sum of long term bank loan and bond outstanding/ from 
74% in 1982 to 37% in 1991, the Japanese corporations were evidently shifting their 
reliance from private source of debt to the public source. Note that we deliberately 
exclude short term bank loan in the calculation of this ratio because in the problem of the 
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choice between bank loan and bond issue，corporations are presupposed in need of long 
term finance as bond issue is a kind of long term debt. As a result, short term bank loan is 
irrelevant and its inclusion will only blur the real picture of actual corporate choices of 
long term fund. 
What is more pertinent to our analysis, nevertheless, is the different mix between debt 
and equity as well as between bank loans and bond issue chosen by different corporations, 
which are captured by the various CVs On average CV for debt ratio in the period was 
0.34. That means on average the standard deviation of debt ratio was equal to 34% of its 
mean level, showing a high degree of heterogeneity of debt usage. The CVs for all other 
liability components, however, were even higher. For instance, the value of CV for 
bank loan was 0.85 for the whole period 1982 - 91，which was 2.5 times of that of debt 
ratio. The CV for bond ratio was the greatest, even though it was decreasing over time 
which was very likely due to the gradual relaxation of restrictions imposed on the 
eligibility of bond issue, especially the unsecured bonds and bonds issued overseas. As to 
the choice between long term bank loan and bond issue, its variation was both great and 
intensifying among the Japanese corporations, as indicated respectively by the CV of 0.79 
on average as well as its more than doubling of its value from 0.45 to 0.99 in ten years 
time. 
Having examined financial heterogeneity in a general manner, we now turn our attention 
to the interindustry financial differences. The need for doing so is that generally observed 
financial heterogeneity may only reflect a historical accident as implied by the original 
ModigUani and Miller model. Under the assumption of perfect capital market, debt and 
equity or various sources of funds are perfect substitutes such that the mix among them 
would be immaterial to the firm value. As a result, firms may simply choose any mix by 
any criterion, and thus the observed diversity in financing practices is only a historical 
accident beneath which no regularity can be detected. Nevertheless, if we can find that 
there do exist marked and persistent financial differences among firms from different 
industries, then it is not likely accidental. Instead we should expect that there are some 
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economic forces at work and thus our efforts to figure out the factors affecting interfirm 
financial differences can be warranted. 
Table 4.2 shows the average debt ratio of the firms coming from different industries 
during 1982 - 1991. The industrial classification of a firm is based on the scheme of 
Daiwa Industrial Classification and the data of all manufacturing firms are used for 
calculations. The industries listed in the table are ranked and categorized by their debt 
ratios. It is evident that though intragroup comparison reveals little variations in 
interindustry debt usage, pairwise comparison between any two groups shows the 
Table 4.2: Interindustry DifTerences in Average Debt Ratio over 1982 隱 1991® 
Industry Ratio 
Group I (Debt Ratio > 0.70) 
Petroleum & Coal Refining 0.83 
Iron & Steel 0.79 
Pulp & Paper 0.78 
Non-Ferrous Metal 0.77 





Transportation Equipment 0.65 
Glass & Ceramics 0.63 
Group III ( 0.50 < Debt Ratio <0.60) 
Electrical Machinery 0.59 
Food Processing 0.59 
Machinery 0.59 
• Precision Equipment 0.55 
Overall 0.66 
a Source: Analyst Guide, Daiwa Securities Research Institute, various issues. 
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difference could be significant. It is particularly the case if we compare the industries from 
Group I to those of Group III. The difference in debt ratio ranges from 18 percentage 
points (non-ferrous metal versus electrical machinery) to 28 percentage points (petroleum 
& coal refining versus precision equipment). 
Apart from the marked differences in debt ratios (at least between some of the industries), 
the relative use of debt by different industries persisted over the whole period of 1982 -
1991. This can be vividly illustrated in the Figure 4.1 shown below. We present the data 
in four graphs instead of one is simply due to the reason of achieving visual clarity. 
Groupings of industries are based on their order shown in the Daiwa Industrial 
Classification, and thus not the same as the one shown in Table 4.2. 
Figure 4.1: Interindustry Differences in Debt Ratio, 1982 - 1991 
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Every point in a graph represents the average debt ratio among the firms belonging to the 
same industry in a particular year. It is clear from each graph that，few exceptions aside, 
the ranking of industries in terms of debt ratio at every point of time is the same. For 
instance, in Figure 4.1a, firms in pulp and paper industries used consistently the largest 
amount of debt in percentage terms whereas those from food processing used the lowest 
throughout the period 1982 - 1991. Equivalently it means that the pattern of relative use 
of debt by different industries persisted over time. 
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Apart from debt usage behaviour, the interindustry choices of loan ratio also exhibited 
great variations. The figures in Table 4.3 help to reveal this situation, which are 
computed with the data of firms contained in our sample"^ . 
Table 4.3: Interindustry Differences in Average Loan Ratio, 1982 - 1991'' 
Industry Ratio 
Group I (Ratio > 0.60) 
Petroleum & Coal Refining 0.79 
Pulp & Paper 0.70 
Iron & Steel 0.61 
Group II (0.50 < Ratio < 0.60) 
Textiles 0.58 
Glass & Ceramics 0.56 
Non-Ferrous Metal 0.56 
Chemicals 0.52 
Rubber 0.51 
Group III (Ratio < 0.50) 
Transportation Equipment 0.49 
Metal 0.48 
Machinery 0.48 
Precision Equipment 0.41 
Food Processing 0.40 
Electrical Machinery 0.34 
a The calculations of the figures are based on the data of our sample of firms 
Just like the case of Table 4.2, we rank and categorize the industries in accordance with 
the values of their ratios so that the differences can be made more visible. Again the 
variations between groups are marked When we compare the industries from Group I to 
those in Group III，the difference ranges from 12 percentage points (iron & steel versus 
transportation equipment) to 35 percentage points (petroleum and coal refining versus 
electrical machinery). Intragroup comparisons, however, also manifest great contrasts, 
even though it depends on the fineness in the categorization. For instance, the range of 
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the ratio in Group l is 18 percentage points. The corresponding figures for Group H and 
in are 7 and 15 percentage points respectively. 
Figure 4.2 are intended to demonstrate that the variations in the loan ratio among 
industries were persistent. Again we present the data in four graphs for visual clarity and 
the grouping of industries are in accordance with the order shown in the Daiwa Industrial 
Classification. It is clear that though the pattern is not as apparent as the case of debt 
ratio, we do find the differences in the loan ratio are persistent, as least for some 
industries. For example, in Figure 4.2a the firms from pulp & paper industries had the 
highest loan ratio consistently over the firms from other three industries throughout the 
period 1982 - 1991. The same is also applied to the firms in petroleum and coal refining in 
Figure 4.2b (except for 1982). 
Interindustry Differences in Loan Ratio, 1982 - 1991 
Figure 4.2a 
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We have seen that there exist great financial variations among the Japanese manufacturing 
corporations. In particular, we have demonstrated that the interindustry financial 
differences are marked and persistent. As a result, it should be expected that some types 
of firms prefer using debt to equity or using bank loans to bond issues. Who are these 
firms? What are the proper categorizations of firms for discriminating their financial 
behaviour? We shall explore the answers to these questions in the next section with the 
insights from the various theoretical and empirical studies in corporate finance. 
C. Factors Affecting the Debt-Equity and Bank Loan-Bond Issue Choices 
In fact the nature of the choice of debt versus equity is different from that of bank loan 
versus bond issue. The former refers to the choice of security type whereas the latter is 
concerned with the choice of provider (private or public), given the type of security (in 
our case it is debt). Therefore it is not astonishing to find that these two choices are 
driven by different sets of considerations. We shall divide the discussions into two parts， 
pertaining to the determinants of these two choices respectively. Since we have reviewed 
these arguments in Chapter 2，we shall be brief on them in the following discussions. 
Debt-Equity Choice 
We shall categorize the arguments in six groups，pertaining to the considerations of 
taxation, bankruptcy cost, agency cost, pecking order hypothesis, and the others. 
Tax-related Arguments 
As noted by Modigliani and Miller (1963), tax deductibility of interest payments makes 
debt financing more favourable than equity financing. It is so because tax-deductibility of 
interest payment implies that the effective interest rate, and hence the effective cost， 
associated with debt is reduced. The lower the cost, the higher the demand for debt will 
be. 
52 
Two implications spring up from this argument. First, if a corporation faces a higher 
corporate income tax rate compared to the others, then it will have a greater incentive to 
use debt. The reason is that greater tax rate means tax savings from a given amount of 
interest payments increases, which lowers the effective interest rate from debt. Second, 
as pointed out by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Dotan and Ravid (1985)，non-debt 
tax shields could act as substitutes for interest deductions since the former will increase 
the probability for a firm to be tax-exhausted, a situation in which the amount of such tax 
shields is so large that the firm need not pay any tax at all. As a result, the benefit of the 
aforementioned tax savings from tax deductibility of interest payments will vanish. 
Therefore if a tax system allows for certain types of non-debt tax shields, we should 
expect that the greater the amount of non-debt tax shields, the more likely that a firm will 
become tax-exhausted, and thus the less debt will be used. 
To apply these propositions to the case of Japan, we need to discern her tax law. Indeed 
under its stipulations, differential corporate income tax rate could arise from one of the 
following three situations, 
(1) If the amount of paid-in capital of a corporation is less than 100 million yen, then the 
first 8 million of its taxable income will be liable to the corporation tax rate which is lower 
than the normal rate. Nevertheless normal tax rate will be applied to any amount in excess 
of 8 million yen，. 
(2) If a corporation is a family corporation, which is defined as a firm with more than 
50% of its shares held by not more than three shareholders or other persons connected 
with them (e.g. their family members), then it will be liable to additional corporate tax 
rate on its retained earnings .^ 
53 
(3) If a corporation enjoys a capital gain from the sales of a land possessed for five years 
or less, then it will be subject to a surtax on capital gains. Higher rate will be applied to 
the case where the ownership period of the land being sold is two years or less''. 
In light of these stipulations, our first proposition implies that a "small" firm falling to the 
situation (1) will use less debt than the others. Meanwhile, we should also expect that the 
family corporations or the firms with taxable land sales as defined in situation (3) will use 
more debt than the others as its liability to higher tax rate implies greater tax savings for 
using debt. Nevertheless, our analysis will not cater for these cases for two reasons. 
First, our sample does not cover the types of firms mentioned in (1) and (2). It is the case 
because, as noted before, our sample is drawn from the manufacturing corporations listed 
in First Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange. These firms are among the largest in Japan， 
while both family corporations and firms with paid-in capital 100 million yen or less are 
small in scale. Second, as to the situation (3), since we do not have the data of land 
transaction nor the ownership period, we are not able to tell whether a corporation is 
subject to a greater tax rate during a given period. 
With respect to non-debt tax shields, the following three items are tax-deductible as 
permitted by the tax law in Japan, 
(1)，Direct expenses 
The major items under direct expenses are depreciation expense and research and 
development expense. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Japanese corporations 
prefer employing the declining-balance method for calculating depreciation so as to 
achieve greater present tax savings. At the same time, on top of normal depreciation, 
some corporations (such as those located in underdeveloped areas or those belonging to 
designated industries) can charge for special depreciation which can also be deducted from 




(2)' Tax credit for research and development 
In addition to deducting from the gross profit directly，the expense for research and 
development may also earn a firm a tax credit. To get the credit, the amount of the 
expense in the current accounting period must be greater than the largest of such expense 
in any preceding accounting period since 1966®. 
(3)，Various tax-deductible reserves 
Corporations in Japan are allowed to draw some of their retained earnings as reserves for 
various purposes which are tax-deductible. Examples include reserves for bad debt, price 
fluctuation，bonus payments and retirement allowances. 
In order to test the effect of non-debt tax shields on the debt usage, we shall put the 
variable (Depreciation expense + R&D expense + Tax-deductible reserves)/Total asset 
into the our econometric model. Indeed this variable is corresponding to the items (1)， 
and (3)' above. As to tax credit for research and development expense, we are not able 
to quantify it since doing so requires the data of such expense since 1966 while our data 
dates back to 1982 only. 
Bankruptcy Cost-related Arguments 
The central thrust of bankruptcy cost argument is that the likelihood of bankruptcy will 
check the use of debt by a firm. More debt means greater interest expenses, which 
implies that the increased probability for a firm to be unable to cover the interest expenses 
with operating income. When it occurs, the firm will experience financial distress or even 
become bankrupt. As bankruptcy could mean reduction in real wealth of the shareholders, 
they will balance the benefits of using debt (e.g. tax savings) with the expected cost of 
bankruptcy to obtain the optimal mix. 
We can derive two propositions from the above argument. First, the higher the cost of 
bankruptcy, the greater the incentive for a firm to avoid its happening and the lower the 
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debt will be used. Using this proposition to explain the interfirm heterogeneity in using 
debt entails the demonstration that, other things being equal, some types of firms face a 
lower cost of bankruptcy than the others. What are these firms and why? 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, conceptually bankruptcy cost can be divided into 
two components: direct cost and indirect cost. Direct cost refers to the out-of-the-pocket 
legal and administrative expenses associated with the bankruptcy process. These 
expenses, however, have been found to be insignificant relative to the prebankruptcy 
market value of the bankrupt firms (Warner (1977); Weiss (1990)). Moreover，there is 
no reason a priori to suspect that some kinds of firms will face a lower direct cost than the 
others. Thus we do not expect that the direct cost of bankruptcy plays important role in 
the debt-equity choice. 
If direct cost of bankruptcy is immaterial and if bankruptcy cost does affect the debt 
behaviour, then indirect cost should matter. Indirect cost of bankruptcy refer to the 
implicit costs arising from financial distress，which can manifest in many ways. For 
example, a financially-distressed firm may have to forgo profitability investment projects 
due to its inability to solicit new funding, or experience reduction in sales because the 
i .丨 
customers may suspect that the availability of after-sales services is in doubt. 
Then what types of firms are subject to a lower indirect cost of bankruptcy in Japan? 
Hoshi et al have conducted an empirical study on this subject (1990). The major finding 
of their study is that, after experiencing financial distress for two consecutive years 
(where financial distress is defined as the ratio of operating income to interest expense is 
less than 1)，the corporations belonging to one of the major keiretsi/ outperform the non-
affiliated firms in terms of greater amount of investment and sales. The ultimate basis of 
their argument is that the root of this indirect cost of financial distress is the difficulty of 
renegotiating financial claims. It is especially true when there are a large number of 
creditors because of the free rider problem (an individual bears the full cost of 
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renegotiation, but shares the benefits with other creditors (Bulow and Shoven (1978); 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1990)) and the information problem (bondholders may not be 
well-informed about the firm to decide whether to grant financial relief or even to supply 
new capital). As a result, the perceived likelihood of the firm ceased to be a going 
concern is increased, which may lead to other side effects that in turn raises the indirect 
cost of financial distress further or even hastens the collapse of the firm. For example, the 
firm's suppliers may not be willing to extend trade credit. It is particularly acute to the 
case of Japan since, as we have seen，Japanese corporations depend considerably on 
trade credit for financing (at least on the gross basis). At the same time, the firm's 
customers may vote with their feet as its ability to honour its warranties is questionable. 
In spite of this, as argued by Hoshi et al,, if a firm is a member of major keiretsu, then 
the above problems are likely to be less severe. Recall from the previous chapter that the 
salient characteristics of the relationship between a firm with its main bank within a 
grouping are that the latter serves as the largest creditor and one of the prominent 
shareholders of the former. As the stakeholders are relatively concentrated, the free-rider 
problems should be less prevalent. Moreover, as there is a smooth flow of information 
between the main bank and the firm through the various arrangements such as regular 
meetings in president councils and the transfers of directors to the firm, the asymmetric 
information problem would be less acute. Also since the keiretsu firms have well-
established trading ties with other member firms, the latter will be more willing to extend 
trade credit or even purchase from or sell to a financially-distressed member firms at 
preferential terms in expectation that the latter will do the same when the former are in 
financial troubles^ ®. 
This study of Hoshi et al. has a direct bearing on our analysis because in principle we can 
identify a group of firms that will incur less cost during financial distress: the member 
corporations of keiretsu. According to our proposition, since such corporations face a 
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lower cost in financial distress due to group affiliations, we would expect that they will 
use more debt compared with the non-affiliated firms. 
To make the testing of this implication operational, there are two problems that needs to 
be resolved: First, how to identify keiretsu members? It is a critical question because the 
analytical findings are sensitive to the definition of membership in such groupings. In fact 
the keiretsu membership is not defined in the black-and-white manner. There is no formal 
list of corporate membership kept by each grouping. Studies on keiretsu (including those 
by Hoshi et al) depend either directly or indirectly^^ in the list compiled in a publication 
called Keiretsu no Kenkvu. However，as pointed out by Hadley (1984), there are several 
misclassification errors in the list^ ,^ which makes the validity of the results of the studies 
are in doubt. 
In face of this problem, we have essentially two options: using the list ofNagatani (1984) 
with adjustments based on the comments by Hadley (1984); or simply denoting the 
members of president councils in each major keiretsu only as corporate members of these 
] 
1 groupings. The second option is justifiable because, unlike the case of general 
i 
！ membership, the list of membership in the president council is well-defined and kept by 
each grouping. Nevertheless, the cost of doing so is another misclassification error: the 
misidentification of general member corporations of major keiretsu as non-affiliated firms, 
which is probably more severe than the error of the inclusion of non-member corporations 
into such groupings. Therefore, we shall go for the first option in the definition of 
keiretsu membership. 
Once the first problem is overcome，the second one emerges: How to determine the 
fineness of categorization of firms for our estimation purpose? Should it be a simple 
dichotomy of affiliated firms versus non-affiliated firms as done by Hoshi et all Or 
should the members of different groupings be demarcated? 
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In fact the fineness in the firm categorization depends very much on the underlying 
hypotheses to be tested. If we simply want to know the difference in debt usage behaviour 
between affiliated firms and the non-affiliated firms, then a simple dichotomy will be 
sufficient for our purpose. But if our interest lies in the differential behaviours of firms 
from different groupings, then a finer categorization will be required. 
Table 4.4，which shows the debt ratios of various categories of firms by group affiliations 
during 1982 - 1991, may give us clues to resolve this problem. As indicated in the last 
two rows in the table, we do observe that there were differences on debt ratios between 
affiliated and non-affiliated firms, ranging from 5 to 8 percentage points. With respect to 
the intergroup differential， we do not find marked variations among groupings. 
Nevertheless, we do find differences in debt ratios between council members and the non-
council members in four out of the six groupings (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and 
Fuyo). In the first three cases (the keiretsu with zaibatsu origins), their council members 
consistently used more debt than their non-council members. However, the converse is 
observed for the Fuyo Group. Thus we should expect that group affiliations could have 
differential effects on council members and non-council members. 
In view of these observations and our argument, we shall test the effects of industrial 
groupings on debt equity ratio by inserting two dummy variables for the council members 
and non-council members oi keiretsu respectively. The testing of the significance of both 
variables helps determine whether the keiretsu affiliations help lower bankruptcy cost，and 
hence increase debt-equity ratio. Meanwhile, the testing of the significance of the 
difference between the coefficients of these dummies gives us hints about the possible 
differential effects of keiretsu affiliations on council members and non-council members. 
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Table 4.4: Debt Ratios of Keiretsu Firms versus Non-Affiliated Firms® 
Groupings “ 19^ 麗 
Mitsubishi (31) 0.67 0.62 0.58 0.58 
Council members (11) 0.82 0.78 0.71 0.68 
Non-council members (20) 0.58 0.56 0.51 0.54 
Mitsui (35) 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.57 
Council members (12) 0.76 0.74 0.67 0.66 
Non-council members (23) 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Sumitomo (36) 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.57 
Council members (8) 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.68 
Non-council members (28) 0.61 0.58 0.56 0.54 
DKB (27) 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.63 
Council members (19) 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.64 
Non-council members (8) 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.59 
Fuyo (24) 0.66 0.64 0.57 0.57 
Council members (8) 0.59 0.56 0.49 0.51 
Non-council members (16) 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.61 
Sanwa(31) 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 
Council members (23) 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.55 
Non-council members (8) 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.57 
Ml keiretsu ^ s (179) 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.58 
Non-affiliated firms (178) 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.51 
a The list of council members is obtained from Industrial Groupings of Japan - The Anatomy of the 
"Keiretsu", Dodwell Marketing Consultants, Tenth Edition, 1993. The list of non-council members is 
drawn from the appendix of Nagatani (1984)，after taking the comments of Hadley (1984) into account. 
The debt ratios are calculated based on our sample data. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of 
firms belonging to a particular category in our sample. 
There is another type of indirect cost associated with bankruptcy. When a firm is 
bankrupt, then its assets will be liquidated so as to meet its debt obligations as much as 
possible. Nevertheless, the eventual amount received by creditors depends on the 
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collateral value of the assets being liquidated which in turn depends on the various 
attributes of these assets. They are liquidity, tangibility (Myers (1983); Long and Malitz 
(1985)) and firm-specificity (Williamson (1985)). The more liquid the assets (such as 
bank deposits or marketable securities), the lower the cost will be incurred in selling it, 
and thus the receipt of the creditors will be higher. Likewise, tangible (e.g. equipment or 
land holdings) or non-firm-specific assets are of more value to creditors than nontangible 
or firm-specific asset (such as goodwill) under bankruptcy since the value of the latter will 
dissipate when a firm ceases to be a going concern while the former will not. Based on 
these considerations, we would expect that the creditors of a firm with less liquid or 
tangible assets or with more firm-specific assets will demand a higher premium for lending, 
which constitutes the other type of indirect cost associated with bankruptcy. 
To cater for these effects，we shall place two explanatory variables into the regression 
equation: the ratios of liquid assets and tangible assets to total assets of a firm. As to the 
case of firm-specificity, while it is a useful theoretical concept to understand financial 
behaviour, it is hard to be measured and thus compared among firms. As a result, we 
shall not consider this effect in our regression equation. 
So far we concentrate on elaborating the first implication of bankruptcy cost argument. 
We now turn to the second implication: Given the possible costliness of bankruptcy or 
financial distress, then the greater the bankruptcy risk a firm is subject to，the less the 
amount of debt it will use. Underlying this proposition is the fact that，apart from the 
level of debt usage, there are many factors affecting the bankruptcy risk of a firm. Then 
we would expect that debt will be used to balance these factors so as to control the level 
of bankruptcy risk. The question is，what are these factors? 
As financial distress occurs when the operating income is not sufficient to meet the interest 
payments, it follows that the level of operating income matters. The greater the level of 





relevant is the business risk, or the perceived variance of operating income in the current 
period, since it may influence the likelihood of interest payments not being covered. The 
other and a widely-cited factor is firm size (Smith and Warner (1979); Friend and 
Hasbrouck (1988); Crutchley and Hansen (1989); Chiarella ^ a / . (1992)). The rationale 
is that the larger the size of the firm，the more diversified portfolio it can maintain，and 
thus the lower the bankruptcy risk. 
Apart from lowering the cost of financial distress，affiliations with keiretsu also lowers the 
probability of being bankrupt. As shown in the last chapter, there are a number of 
incidents in which the banks within the groupings bailed out the group firms which were at 
the brink of bankruptcyi�.Thus we should expect that this function of lowering the 
bankruptcy risk would reinforce the reduction in the cost of financial distress which makes 
the keiretsu firms use more debt than the non-affiliated firms. 
To test these effects on debt usage behaviour, we insert the following variables in our 
model The first one is the ratio of operating income to total asset, which measures the 
i level of operating income. With respect to the perceived operating risk, we shall follow 
the practice of literature to use the historical volatility of operating income as proxy 
although the results are mixed in previous empirical studies^ .^ Lastly, we shall use the 
log annual sales volume to gauge the size of a firmi^ 
Agency Cost-related Arguments 
One of the bases of agency cost argument is the possible conflict of interests between 
shareholders and debtholders, which would ultimately raise the cost of debt incurred by 
the firm. The classical example of such conflict comes from the study by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Under the condition of limited liability, shareholders of a firm will 
always have the incentive to undertake risky projects. It is the case because when the 
project is successful, then the shareholders will capture most of the gains. By contrast, if 
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it fails, the provision of limited liability will bound the loss suffered by the shareholders. 
Equivalently what this means is that the firm's creditors can only get fixed payments if the 
project succeeds but bear most of the loss when if it fails. As creditors are assumed to 
know the shareholders' incentive to undertaking risky projects, they will require a higher 
premium for lending. 
Such a conflict of interests between debtholders and shareholders arise because they are 
different parties. If we jump to the extreme that when the same party takes the role of 
debtholder and shareholder simultaneously, then the aforementioned conflict of interest 
will surely vanish. What this implies is that the larger the amount of shares are held by the 
firm's creditors, the less acute the problem of the conflict of interest will be，and more 
debt will be used by the firm. 
To capture this effect，we introduce the variable of the proportion of a firm's shares held 
by financial institutions and other corporations into our regression equation. The reason 
for taking the shares held by corporations into consideration is simply because such 
corporations could be the providers of trade credit to the firm. 
Pecking Order Hypothesis 
Mayer (1990) has found that one of the salient stylized facts about the aggregate 
corporate financing is that internal fund is the most significant source of funds in many 
major industrial countries (including Japan). It makes sense because internal fund has a 
cost advantage over the external fund under asymmetric information, which is a prevalent 
situation characterizing most of the financial relationships. As a consequence，firms will 
have preference on internal fUnd over external fund, resulting in the observed general 
predominance of the former. 
The direct implication of this argument on the debt-equity choice is that the greater the 
availability of internal fund, the more the firm will use internal fiind. Since internal fund is 
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one form of equity capital, increased availability of internal fund will encourage more 
equity usage, and thus the debt ratio will be lower. In other words, variations in the 
availability in internal fund among firms will lead to the different degree of debt usage. 
We shall use the variable (Net income/Total asset) to gauge the availability of internal 
fund. Since this also measures the net profitability of a firm, it follows that the more the 
profitability of a firm, the less the debt equity ratio will be since it has more internal fund 
available for financing capital investments. 
Other Explanatory Variables 
Apart from the above variables, we shall also insert a dummy for the firms belonging to 
the petroleum and coal refining industry since as reviewed in the last section, these firms 
on average have the highest debt ratio compared with the firms in other industries. 
Therefore, we suspect there may be some industry-specific effects which may not be 
captured by the above arguments. 
To conclude this subsection, we present all arguments, their proxy explanatory variables 
and the expected effects on leverage that we have discussed in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Determinants of Debt-Equity Choice 
Factors Proxy Variables Effect on Debt 
-Non-debt tax shields (DEP+R&D+RES/TA) -







-Agency cost (BCSH/SHARES) + 
_ Pecking order (NET/TA) -
-Others I + 
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Explanatory notes for Table 4 .5: 
DEP: Depreciation e?q)ense. 
SIZE: Log of sales. 
R&D: Research and development e职nse. 
RES: Tax-deductible reserves. 
TA: Total asset. 
G1 ： Dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is a council member of any group; 0 
otherwise. 
G2: Dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is a non-council member of any group; 0 
otherwise. 
TAN: Tangible assets. 
LA: Current assets. 
OPER: Operating income. 
CVOPER: Coefficient of variation for (OPER/TA). 
BCSH: Number of shares held by banks and corporations. 
SHARES: Total number of shares issued by a corporation. 
NET: Net profit 
I： Dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm belongs to petroleum & coal refining 
industry; 0 otherwise. 
Bank Loan-Bond Issue Choice 
The bank loan-bond issue choice in essence is a choice between private and public debt. 
Mackie-Mason (1990) has set out a framework for analyzing the factors affecting this 
choice. As mentioned in the last chapter, the basic argument is that，under asymmetric 
information, what governs the use of public debt is the amount of lemon premium 
required by the outside investors, which in turn depends on the amount of information 
possessed by these investors about the firm. The less information the investors have, the 
greater the lemon premium they demand, and the higher the cost of public debt will be. 
As a result, firms wiU tend to use less public debt but more private debt. By contrast，if 
the investors are well-informed regarding the future prospects of a firm，then they will 
require a lower premium and hence lower cost of public debt. Therefore we expect that 
the firm will tend to use more public debt but less private debt. 
The above argument presupposes the lemon premiums required by banks are the same 
across firms so that all variations in the choice of private debt versus public debt can be 
explained by the differential information possessed, and hence differential premiums 
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demanded, by investors with regard to different firms. Nevertheless, differential access 
to the firms' private information by banks could also exist. In other words, the 
differential access to private information of a firm by both the banks and the public 
investors are critical to the firm's choice of private debt versus public debt. It is especially 
the case in Japan since we suspect that due to the arrangements of regular meetings in 
president councils as well as sending directors to member firms, keiretsu banks should 
have more private information about the keiretsu firms than the other non-affiliated 
borrowing firms. As a result, the lemon premiums required by the keiretsu banks on the 
former should be smaller than that on the latter. 
One may argue that what is implied is only that, compared with the non-affiliated firms, 
keiretsu firms will use more loans supplied by the banks within the same grouping. It may 
not infer that the loan ratio oi keiretsu firms will be higher than non-affiliated firms due to 
the following reasons, 
(1) Keiretsu firms also have borrowings from the banks outside their groupings. As noted 
in the previous chapter，the amount of these loans typically accounts for three quarters of 
total loan amount of keiretsu firms. 
(2) The lemon premiums required by non-keiretsu banks on keiretsu firms will not be as 
low as those by keiretsu banks due to the former are not supposed to possess the private 
information of the firms as the latter do. 
(3) Therefore, we should not expect the difference in total lemon premiums {keiretsu 
banks + non-keiretsu banks) incurred by keiretsu firms and non-keiretsu firms is significant 
due to the overwhelming portion of loans amount of keiretsu firms is supplied by non-
keiretsu banks. As a result, the variations in their loan ratios would not be marked. 
This argument overlooks one important fact that, as discussed in the last chapter, the 
main banks in keiretsu act as the delegated monitor for all other creditors of member 
firms. In the previous chapter, we have shown that there were a number of incidents in 
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which when keiretsu firms were bankrupt, then their main banks would take up the losses 
of other creditors . As a result, it is not unreasonable to expect that the mn-keiretsu 
banks will behave as if they have the same information about the keiretsu firms as the 
keiretsu banks. Then our argument implies that keiretsu firms should have a higher loan 
ratio relative to the non-keiretsni firms. Similar to the case of debt ratio，we shall divide 
the firms into three groups: council members and non-council members oi keiretsu as well 
as the non-affiliated firms. 
Apart from the group affiliations, we shall also incorporate the following hidden 
information indicators in the regression equation as suggested by Mackie-Mason: 
Dividend payment, forecasting variance of earnings (following Mackie-Mason, we shall 
use the variance of the first difference of operating income as proxy), annual change in 
stock price of a firm, and the intensity in research and developmenti6. At the same time, 
we shall also enter the following variables. The first is log of sales which measures the 
size of firm. Our expectation is that its effect on the loan ratio is negative due to 
government regulation. The larger a firm, the more likely that it is eligible to issue bond， 
then its bond usage should be greater. Another interpretation that is consistent with the 
story of Mackie-Mason is that larger firm may have greater reputation, and hence lower 
lemon premium required by the investors. The second one is banks' holdings of shares of 
a firm. We expect that the effect on loan ratio is negative for risk diversification. The last 
one is the dummy for the firms in petroleum and coal industry to capture the possible 
industry-specific effect. 
I 
We summarize these propositions, their proxy explanatory variables and their expected 
effects on bank loan-bond issue choice in Table 4.6 shown in the next page. 
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Table 4.6: Determinants of Bank Loan-Bond Issue Choice 
Factors Proxy Variables Effect on Bank Loan/Bond 
-Group affiliation G1 + 
G2 + 
-Dividend behaviour DIV _ 
-Forecasting variance VOPER + 
of earnings 
-Change in stock price CSP -




Explanatory notes for Table 4.6: 
G1 & G2: Group dummies (see Table 4.5 for detailed definitions) 
DIV： Dummy variable which equals 1 if the payout ratio of a firm is positive; 0 
otherwise. 9 
VOPER: Variance of the first difference of operating income divided by 10 
CSP: Annual percentage change in stock price. 
R&D: Research and development expense. 
SALES: Sales volume. 
BSHR: Percentage of shares of a firm held by banks. 
I: Dummy for the firms in petroleum and coal refining industry. 
I 
D. Data Sources and Methods of Sampling and Estimation 
The data used for estimation is individual firm data of a sample of 357 Japanese 
manufacturing corporations listed in the First Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange during 
1982 - 1991. There are two data sources: various issues of Analyst Guide and Jap^ 
Company Handbook published by Daiwa Securities Research Institute and Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun Inc. respectively. These two publications provide major accounting information 
of each individual firm listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
There are two criteria for drawing this sample. First, they must be listed in the First 
Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange continuously throughout 1982 - 1991. Second, they 
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must have the same accounting period for the reason of comparability among firms. We 
have selected firms with accounting period April 1st - March 31st since it is more common 
among the Japanese corporations. In other words, the sample is not a random sample. 
As a consequence，the obtained statistics and the estimation results may not be carried 
over to the whole population. The distribution of firms in our sample across industries are 
shown in Table 4.7， 
Table 4.7: Distribution of Firms in the Sample by Industry 
Number of Firms 
Industry (A) In the Sample (B) In the Population^ (A)/(B) 
Food 24 54 0.44 
Textiles 13 43 0.30 
Pulp & Paper 12 18 0.67 
Chemicals 65 119 0.55 
Petroleum & Coal 6 9 0.67 
Rubber 5 9 0.56 
Glass & Ceramics 13 31 0.42 
Iron & Steel 24 36 0.67 
Non-Ferrous Metal 18 24 0.75 
Metal 13 21 0.62 
Machinery 47 83 0^57 
Electrical Machinery 59 103 0.51 
Transportation Equip. 35 48 
Precision Equip. 15 18 
Miscellaneous 8 26 0.31 
Total 357 642 0.56 
a The population figures are as at 1988. Source: Analyst Guide, Daiwa Securities Research Institute. 
Since our data set is a combined time-series cross-sectional data, direct application of 
OLS estimation method may not be appropriate since there may exist correlations in the 
residuals among different firms within the same period or between different time periods 
of the same firm which invalidate the underlying assumptions of OLS. 
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In general, there can be three methods for estimating a model which is based on a 
combined time-series cross-sectional data set. The first is called within estimator, or 
more commonly known as dummy variable estimator. 'Within" because it utilizes the 
variation of a cross sectional unit only to estimate the parameters of a model. The second 
one is called between estimator, under which OLS is applied to the means of various 
variables specified in the model. The means of the variables are calculated by averaging 
across time for each cross sectional unit. As a result, the number of observations under 
this method will be equal to the number of cross sectional units in the data set，and the 
estimation will based solely on the variation between different cross sectional units. That 
is why this estimator is called between estimator. The last one is known as error 
component estimator, which is in fact a generalized least square estimator. It can be 
shown that it is an efficient combination of within estimator and between estimator (Judge 
etal. (1985), pp.523). 
The choice of estimation choice depends very much on the objective of the study. Recall 
that our primary objective is to understand the determinants of the observed variations 
among firms in choosing optimal debt-equity mix and bank loan-bond issue mix. Thus we 
should use a estimation method which produces the estimates that reflect purely the 
interfirm differences. Consequently, we adopt the between estimator for our study since 
it can serve our purpose. Since both of the within estimator and the error component 
estimator make use wholly or partly the variations within an individual cross sectional unit, 
they are not pertinent to our study. 
E. Estimation Results and Discussions 
In this section, we shall present the estimation results and discern their implications. But 
before further proceeding, we first discuss the data adjustments and the choice of the 
dependent variables used for estimation. 
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As noted in the previous chapter, the accounting data of Japanese corporations cannot be 
directly compared with those of their western counterparts due to the differences in 
treatment of the tax-deductible reserves. In western accounting practices, such reserves 
are counted as owner's equity. Nevertheless, they are posted as liabilities by the Japanese 
corporations (Suzuki and Wright (1985)). In principle, since these reserves are drawn 
discretionally from the retained earnings, they do not represent any liability of a 
corporation. Thus they should be regarded as equity instead of liability. In view of this 
argument, we shall deduct the amount of such reserves from total liabilities of each 
corporation and then add that amount to shareholders' equity to derive the "correct" 
levels of debt and equity^? 
For the estimation of regression of debt-equity choice, we may either use debt ratio or 
debt-equity ratio as dependent variable which are theoretically equivalent. Nevertheless, 
there are some firms whose total liabilities are greater than their assets. As a result, these 
firms will have a very high debt ratio but very low debt-equity ratio from the arithmetical 
point of view. In view of the fact that such firms are heavy debt users, debt ratio rather 
than the debt-equity ratio can reflect their real situations. Therefore we shall use debt 
ratio rather than debt-equity ratio for our econometric estimation. 
Likewise, with regard to the choice of bank loan-bond issue, there are two options for 
dependent variable, the ratio of bank loan to bond outstanding or the loan ratio which are 
again theoretically equivalent. In our study, we have used the latter as dependent variable 
for a practical reason. There are some firms in our sample that either do not use any bank 
loans or do not issue bonds or both. It implies that both options could result undefined 
dependent variable as division by zero is involved. To avoid this problem, we have to 
exclude some of these firms from our sample. If we use the ratio of bank loan to bond 
outstanding or its reciprocal as dependent variable, then we have to delete the 
observations of firms with zero bond outstanding or zero bank borrowing respectively. 




the data of firms with both zero bank borrowings and zero bond outstanding which are 
relatively rare in our sample. In light of these considerations, we opt for loan ratio as the 
dependent variable so as to maximize the number of degree of freedom. 
Meanwhile, as justified Section B, we shall only include long term bank loans in defining 
the loan ratio. Based on the aforementioned considerations, the regression equations for 
the debt-equity choice and bank loan-bond choice are specified respectively as follows, 
k 
(D/TA)i = ao + Za jXj + Si (i=l……357; k=ll) (1) 
j=l 
k， 
L/(L+B)i = po + SPjZj + Tii (i=l……337; k'=9) (2) 
where 
D: Debt outstanding. 
TA: Total asset. 
L: Long term bank borrowings. 
B: Bond outstanding. 
Xj： The explanatory variables for the debt-equity choice as shown in Table 4.5. 
The explanatory variables for the bank loan-bond issue choice as shown in 
J Table 4.6. 
Recall that we shall use the between estimator for estimation. Thus all the variables 
specified in the equations (1) and (2) are the means of variables over the period 1987 垂 
1991 The reason for averaging over this period instead of the 1982 - 1991 is that one of 
the explanatory variable in equation (1) is the historical volatility of operating income 
which is a proxy for the operating risk faced by a firm. This variable is measured by the 
coefficient of variation of operating income during the current period and the past five 
periods. Consequently, the M set of variables for estimation is available since 1987, 
which accounts for the reason why we only average the variables over 1987 - 1991. 
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We shall first discuss the estimation results of the equation (1) first, which are shown in 
the Table 4.8 below. Note that we do not show the results for the variance of the 
operating income as well as the corporate shareholdings since both of these variables are 
found to be statistically insignificant. As a result, we re-estimate the model by dropping 
these two variables. The possible reasons for their insignificance will be discussed in the 
latter part of this section. 
Table 4.8: Estimation Results for Debt-Equity Choice Equation 
Factors Variables Estimate t-Statistic 
Intercept 0.2040 1.994 
Non-debt tax shield (DEP+R&D+RES)/TA -0.9263 -9.032 
Bankruptcy cost G1 0.0699 4.538 
G2 0.0486 3.732 
(TAN/TA) 0.6083 6.408 
(LA/TA) 0.4248 5.050 
(OPER/TA) 2.3638 6.710 
j SIZE 0.0123 2.161 
Pecking order (NET/TA) -10.1503 -15.182 




The variable measuring the non-debt tax shields is of expected negative sign and 
statistically significant at 5% level. This finding lends support to the models of DeAngelo 
I 
and Masulis (1980) and Dotan and Ravid (1985) which argue the substitutabiUty of non-
debt tax shields for interest deductions. The greater the amount of non-debt tax shields, 
73 
the smaller the portion of interest payments that can be deducted from earnings. 
Consequently, the use of debt will be discouraged. 
� 
With respect to the variables package of bankruptcy cost argument, let us focus on the 
group affiliations first. Both of the group dummies are significant and in the expected 
positive signs. There are two implications for these results: First, on average affiliations 
with keiretsu do enable the member firms to use more debt. Second, there does exist 
differential impacts of keiretsu affiliations on council members and the non-council 
members. Our results show that on average the debt ratio of the council members exceeds 
that of the non-council members by about 2%. It is presumably due to the fact that since 
council members have closer and longer relationships with the main banks so that in case 
of financial distress, they will be more likely to be bailed out compared with the non-
council members. 
The variables gauging the amount of tangible and liquid assets are significant with 
expected positive signs. Again it confirms our hypothesis that the more tangible or liquid 
assets a firm has, the higher the value of collateral when the firm is bankrupt and 
liquidated, and the loss incurred by the creditors, and hence their required premium for 
lending to the firm, will be less. 
The level of operating income also matters in debt-equity choice by Japanese corporations. 
Another variable in the package under bankruptcy cost factor that is also critical to the 
choice of debt ratio is the log of sales, which is the proxy variable for firm size. As 
discussed before, it represents the greater ability of large firms to diversify their portfolios 
and operations and thus the bankruptcy risk faced by them tend to be lower. 
The variable (NET/TA), which enters the equation under the pecking order hypothesis, 
has the greatest value of estimate (in absolute value) and t-statistic. In other words, the 
av沾ability of internal fund is a very important consideration of the Japanese 
74 
manufacturing corporations in choosing their debt policies. The greater the availability of 
internal fund, the less reliance of the firms on external fund in general and on debt in 
particular. 
Lastly, the dummy for the petroleum and coal industry is statistically significant and with 
the expected positive sign. This result suggests some industry-specific factors are in force 
which are not captured by the other variables in the model. One possible factor is the 
preferential government policies toward the firms in petroleum and coal refining industries 
since the First Oil Crisis. Specifically, these firms have been given interest subsidies for 
their borrowing. As a result, the effective interest cost faced by these firms will be 
comparatively lower, which encourages them using more debts 
Having discussed all the results shown in Table 4.8，we now try to explain the statistical 
insignificance of two variables which are included in our model at the very beginning. The 
first one is the variance of operating income. If the variable is a good proxy for the 
business risk faced by the corporations, then its insignificance suggests that the Japanese 
corporations do not regard the business risk in the choice of debt equity ratio, which 
sounds counter-intuitive. Therefore, it is very likely that the variable used does not serve 
i 
as a good proxy for business risk. Recall that business risk is defined as the perceived 
variance of earnings within a single period, which is not necessarily related to its historical 
volatility, the variable used in our model As a result, it seems necessary to search for 
other better proxy variables in fixture work. 
The other variable which has been dropped from our estimated equation is the corporate 
shareholdings. While it is in the expected positive sign, it is not statistically significant. It 
may be due to the fact that the variable proxies another effect: the diversification effect. 
Under this effect, we expect that the banks or firms with large shareholdings of a firm 
should lend less to the firm so as to diversify their risk. As a result, coupled with the 
effect of efficiency cost, the overall effect of this variable on debt ratio will be ambiguous. 
75 
Now we turn to the bank loan-bond issue choice. The estimation results are shown in 
Table 4.9 overleaf. Again we only present the results of the variables which have been 
found to be statistically significant. 
From the table, it is readily observed that group affiliation affects not only the debt-equity 
choice but also the mix between bank loan and bond issue. Both of the coefficients are 
significant. At the same time, the dummy for council member is greater than that of the 
non-council member. This finding confirms our a priori expectation that the close 
relationship between the main bank and the council members supports ensures the smooth 
flow of information, which induces the latter to use more bank loans relative to bond 
issues compared with the non-council members. 
Table 4.9: Estimation Results for Bank Loan-Bond Issue Choice Equation 
Factors Variables Estimate t-Statistic 
Intercept 1.8600 8.657 
Group affiliations G1 0.2210 4.851 
G2 0.1013 2.604 
Dividend payment DIV -0 3076 -2.643 
Forecasting variance VOPER 0.0417 2.468 
in earnings 
Others SIZE -0.0819 -4.238 
BSHR -3.5849 -2.632 
I 0.4194 3.279 
r2 0.1677 
Adjusted r 2 0.1499 
RSS 28.4663 
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Let us switch our focus to the "hidden information indicators" and discuss them in turn. 
DIV, the dummy variable distinguishing firms paying dividend from those that do not, 
has an expected negative sign and statistically significant even at 1% level in both models. 
This finding tells us that dividend payment does carry the information about the future 
prospects of a firm which are by assumption possessed by the firm. As a result, the 
investors of the dividend-paying firm demands a lower lemon premium than those of the 
non-dividend paying firms, which leads to the observed difference in adopted loan ratio. 
With regard to the forecasting variance of the earnings, it is in the expected positive sign 
and significant. It implies that the greater the forecasting variance of earnings, the more 
likely that the investors less information about the future prospects of the firm. Therefore 
a larger premium on bond issue is required. 
The sign of log of sales volume is matched with our a priori expectation and it is 
significant at 5% level. The larger a firm is，the more likely that it is eligible to issue 
bonds of various types. It will be reflected in its choice of bank loan versus bond issues. 
Another interpretation of this result comes from the hidden information story. The larger 
firms tend to be followed more closely by the investment analysts. As a result, the lemon 
premium required by public investors may be lower for them (Mackie-Mason (1990)). 
Lastly, the variable BSHR, the ratio of shares of a firm held by banks, affects negatively 
the loan ratio, which confirms our belief of risk diversification by banks. It is interesting 
to contrast this finding with one of the conclusions in Kim (1991), which is a study on the 
determinants of shareholdings by a firm's main bank in Japan. He has found that one of 
the critical explanatory variables is the amount of financing comes from the main bank. 
The larger the amount of firm's financing comes from its main bank, the greater the 
shareholdings of its main bank. Coupled with our finding of negative relationship between 
banks' shareholdings as a whole and the loan ratio of a firm，it is implied that there is an 
asymmetry in behaviour between the main bank and the other lending banks of a firm: 
77 
Main bank increases their shareholdings with loans granted whereas the converse is true to 
other lending banks. In fact this implication is consistent with the delegated monitor 
hypothesis by Sheard (1989) as mentioned in the last chapter. The significant 
shareholdings position of main bank in fact is to achieve greater capability to monitor or 
even influence the corporate policy of a firm. With this monitoring task taken up by a 
firm's main bank, the other lending banks need not duplicate the efforts and as a result, 
they need not commensurate their shareholdings with loans. 
Similar to the case of debt-equity choice, the dummy for the petroleum and coal industry 
exerts independent positive effect on the bank loan-bond issue choice. This is the case 
because the interest subsidies offered by the Japanese government were available through 
the government financial institutions. As a result, this encouraged these firms to use bank 
loans rather than the bond issues^ .^ 
Again we discuss the variables which have been dropped from the equation. The first one 
is the change in share price, which has been found to be positive and thus it is contrary to 
our expectation. It may be due to the fact that since the period covered in our analysis 
coincides with the "bubble period" 1986-1990 in Japan. In other words，the increase in 
stock price may simply reflect the easy credit condition under the expansionary monetary 
policy of the Bank of Japan rather than the fundamentals of the firms. As a result, the 
variable may not be a good indicator for hidden information in our case. 
The other variable is the research and development intensity, which is also found to have 
the wrong sign. It may be explained by that this variable proxies the future prospects of 
the firm, which tends to lower the lemon premium required by the public investors and 
thus offsets its hidden information effect. 
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F. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have documented the issue of financial heterogeneity among the listed 
manufacturing corporations in Japan. In particular, we are concentrated on the choices 
between debt and equity as well as bank loan and bond issues and identified 
econometrically a number of factors determining the different mixes chosen by different 
types of firms respectively. With respect to the debt-equity choice, we have found that 
the critical variables include non-debt tax shields, affiliations with keiretsu, the amount of 
tangible and liquid assets a firm has，the level of operating income，firm size, the 
availability of internal funds, and the dummy for the petroleum and coal refining industry. 
As to the choice between bank loan and bond issue, our findings indicate that hidden 
information story is useful to discriminating the firms from having high loan ratio from 
those of low loan ratio. Also firm size, the ratio of a firms' shares held by banks, and the 
dummy for petroleum and coal refining industry are also important factors for this choice. 
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Notes: 
1 Nicknamed "Toyota Bank", Toyota wielded 2.19 trillion yen surplus fund at the end of 
1991, which was comparable to the asset of a medium-sized bank in Japan. This large 
amount of fund was put under the management of its subsidiary, Toyota Finance. Hitachi 
has also established a subsidiary called Hitachi Credit Corporation to manage its surplus 
fUnd. 
2 The details of the data sources and the methods of sampling and estimation will be 
precisely spelled out in Section D. 
3 Again for clarity, the term "loan ratio" will be used in replacement of the clumsy 
expression of "the ratio of long term bank loan to long term debt" throughout the chapter. 
4 Here is an asymmetry in the data used for computing the figures in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
(for constructing Figures 4.2 and 4.3 as well): the former is based on the data of all 
Japanese manufacturing corporations listed in the First Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange 
while the latter is on our sample data. It is the case because in Analyst Guide there is a 
table which, grounded on the data of all listed firms, shows the equity ratio by industry. 
The figures in Table 4.2 are calculated by subtracting 1 by these equity ratios. 
Nevertheless, there is no such data for the loan ratio in the publication, we thus have to 
compute the figures with our sample data. 
5 In fiscal 1990，the preferential tax rate was 28%, which was lower than the normal rate 
37.5% by 9.5 percentage points (Takashi (1991), pp.44). 
6 The additional tax is charged on the excess of retained earnings of a family corporation 
over certain amount. In fiscal 1990，the tax rate ranged from around 12% to 24%, 
depending on the size of such excess (Takashi (1991)，pp.62). 
7 In fiscal 1990, the rates for these land transactions were 20% and 30% respectively 
(Takashi (1991),'pp. 97). 
8 In fiscal 1990, the tax credit is the lower of the 10% of the corporation tax or 20% of 
such excess amount (Takashi (1991), pp. 79). 
9 The major keiretsu include Mitsubishi Group, Mitsui Group, Sumitomo Group, DKB 
Group, Fuyo Group and Sanwa Group. 
10 This implicit contract argument is first put forward by Nagatani (1984). 
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“Hoshi et al study is based on the list of keiretsu membership attached as appendix in 
Nagatani's study (1984), whir.h in turn k Hrawn from Keiretsu no Kenkvu. That is what 
"indirectly" means. 
12 As a discussant of Nagatani's study (1984), Hadley (1984) notes that several 
classifications in the list of corporate membership are doubtful. For instance, Toyota was 
regarded as a member of Mitsui Group, even though the firm has zero bank borrowings 
and the main bank of the Group, Mitsui Bank (which was renamed as Mitsui Taiyo Kobe 
Bank after the merger between Mitsui Bank and Taiyo Kobe Bank and then to Sakura 
Bank recently), held only 4.98% of its shares which was only slightly more that wielded 
by Sanwa Bajik, the main bank in the Sanwa Group. 
Suzuki and Wright (1985) found that keiretsu firms are more likely than the non-
affiliated firms to file for reorganization rather than liquidation. 
14 For example, Gordon (1962) found a negative relationship whereas Auerbach (1985) 
found the effect positive (though it is not statistically significant). 
15 One justification for using sales volume as a measure of firm size again comes from the 
study by Suzuki and Wright (1985). Being an important indicator of "social importance" 
of a firm, sales has been found statistically to be a critical factor in reducing the 
bankruptcy risk of Japanese corporations. 
Thus we have left out two hidden information suggested by Mackie-Mason. The first is 
the dummies for industries subject to rate regulation. We have omitted this because no 
industry in our sample is subject to such regulation. The second is the dummy indicating 
loss carryforward by a firm which is due to our lack of information about this behaviour 
about firms in our sample. 
All the figures shown in this chapter are based on the adjusted data, except those in 
Table 4.2 which are based on the original data. 
18 This explanation is not problem-free because this interest-subsidization policy is only 
known to exist since the early 70’s to the early 80's. However, due to the lack of 
information, it is not certain during the late 80，s and the early 90，s (the period covered by 
our sample) such policy was still in force. 
19 See note 18 for the limitation of this explanation. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In this study, we have examined the capital structure choice of the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations from both the aggregate and cross-sectional perspectives. At 
this moment, it seems advisable to summarize the major findings of the study as presented 
as follows, 
1. On the aggregate, the Japanese manufacturing corporations had long been highly 
dependent on debt for financing. Due to the government regulations which served to 
discourage raising funds from domestic and overseas capital markets, the Japanese 
manufacturing corporations turned mainly to banks for their external funding. 
Nevertheless, with the onset of financial deregulations since the late 1970's, the 
Japanese manufacturing corporations could have greater access to the cheaper bond 
financing in both the domestic and overseas markets. Meanwhile, the increase in the 
availability in internal fund had also encouraged the Japanese manufacturing 
corporations to stay away from bank loans because, as suggested by Myers and 
Majluf (1984), internal funding has a cost advantage over the bank loans due to the 
asymmetric information problem. 
2. Cross-sectionally, we have shown that there do exist marked and persistent 
heterogeneity among the Japanese manufacturing corporations in debt usage. With the 
econometric tools, we have identified a number of theoretically-motivated variables 
which are critical to the determination of interfirm differences in debt ratio. They 
include affiliations with keiretsu, the amount of non-debt tax shields, the amount of 
tangible and liquid assets, the level of operating income, firm size，the availability of 
internal funds, and the dummy for the industry of petroleum and coal refining. 
3. Apart from the debt-equity choice, we have also studied the interfirm differences in 
the choice of bank loan and bond issue. We have found that the hidden information 
theory is useful to explain this choice. In other words, the Japanese manufacturing 
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corporations tend to use more market source of debt when investors require lower 
lemon premiums on them. 
This major contribution of this study is to provide a comprehensive and systematic 
treatment of the subject of capital structure decisions of the Japanese manufacturing 
corporations. On the aggregate side, we have tried to delineate the pattern of capital 
structure over the last two decades and explain the observed change in terms of financial 
deregulation as well as the increasing availability of internal funds. This part of study is 
thus building on and extending the existing studies which only attempt to provide an 
overview of major features of various fund sources in Japan (Hodder and Tschoegl (1985 
& 1991)). On the cross-sectional side, we have depicted the interflrm differences in the 
debt-equity structure and drawn the insights from the theoretical and empirical studies to 
build an econometric model for identifying the pertinent determinants for the observed 
differences. This part of study represents a significant improvement over the past study by 
Nagatani (1985) in that on top of the firm size variable, business group dummies as well 
as industry dummies which Nagatani uses, we also introduce other variables such as the 
non-debt tax shields, tangible asset-total asset ratio, and net profit-total asset ratio since 
the existing studies have already shown that these variables are useful to explain the 
capital structure decisions in other context and therefore we should also try them in the 
case of Japan. Indeed the statistical significance of these variables obtained in our study 
implies that the equation in Nagatani's study has omitted relevant variables and thus the 
estimates he gets are very likely subject to bias. With respect to the bank loan-bond issue 
choice, our study is the first attempt to analyze this issue with the hidden information 
framework under the context of Japanese manufacturing corporations. 
It is always claimed that Japan is unique when compared with the western world. 
Nevertheless, this study shows that, at least to the capital structure decision, the 
Japanese manufacturing corporations are not as different from their western counterparts 
as generally perceived since their capital structure decisions are governed by similar 
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economic considerations. In fact, most of the determinants we find to affect the debt-
equity choice of the Japanese manufacturing corporations have already been shown to 
affect the western firms as well. Meanwhile, the hidden information framework that we 
have used to account for the bank loan-bond issue choice in Japan have also been 
demonstrated to be useful to understanding the same choice of the US firms. 
Contributions aside, this study is subject to a number of limitations. The most obvious 
one is in the bank loan-bond issue choice because, as we have seen, from the low 
adjusted R^ of the equation, it is implied that while hidden information theory is important 
to explain the choice between bank loan and bond issue, it is evidently not the only 
determinant. In other words, there should be some other determinants which have been 
neglected by the hidden information framework which requires further explorations 
On top of this, the hidden information theory per se needs improvement at least in the 
following two areas: First, in our estimated equation, we have found that the research 
and development expense is negatively affecting the ratio of long term bank loan to long 
term debt significantly, which is counter to our a priori expectation. In fact Mackie-
Mason (1990) has also obtained the same result as ours. Therefore, it seems that some 
other impacts proxied by the expense of research and development on this choice have yet 
explored. One of the possible neglected impacts is that the intensity of research and 
development activities may signal the future performance of a firm. The greater the 
intensity, the better the future performance is expected from investors, and the lower the 
premium will be demanded. 
Another problem with the hidden information framework lies in its theoretical foundation. 
In fact the explanation of the choice between bank loan and bond issue is based on an 
assumption that there is a differential access to the private information of different firms. 
If the information is really private in the sense that such information is only accessible by 
outside investors only through the disclosure by firms, then the above assumption 
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presupposes that different firms disclose different levels of their information to investors. 
As a result, two interesting questions emerge. First, why it is in the interest of firms to 
disclose their private information to investors? One of the answers in fact can be drawn 
from Myers and Majluf (1984). If investors are informed the future potential, and hence 
the true value of the firm, then they will price the claims on the income from the firm 
fairly such that the underinvestment problem can be avoided even though the firm does not 
have sufficient amount of internal funds for financing. Second, if disclosure of private 
information is beneficial to the existing shareholders of firms, then why should there be 
differential levels of information disclosure among firms as implicit in the assumption of 
Mackie-Mason framework? What are the determinants for the level of information 
disclosure? Only after a satisfactory answer is obtained on this question before the hidden 
information story can be firmly established. 
Therefore much work remains to be accomplished on the choice between bank loans and 
bond issue, and it is hoped that our study would stimulate further theoretical research on 
this issue so as to furnish the hidden information story with a more solid foundations and 
identify other pertinent determinants for the choice between bank loans and bond issue. 
85 
Bibliography 
1. Akerlof，G., "The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics. 84，1970, pp.488-500. 
2. Analyst Guide. Daiwa Securities Research Institute, various issues. 
3. Aoki, Masahiko, "Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm", Journal of 
Economic Literature. Vol. XXVIII, March 1990，pp. 1-27. 
4. Asquith, Paul, and David W. Mullins, Jr., "Equity Issues and Offering Dilution", 
Journal of Financial Economics. 15, 1986, pp.61-89. 
5. Auerbach, Alan J.，'Ileal Determinants of Corporate Leverage", in B. Friedman 
(Ed), Corporate Capital Structures in the United States, University of Chicago Press, 
1985, pp.301-322. 
6. Bagnoli, M., and N. Khanna, "Equilibrium with Debt and Equity Financing of New 
Projects: Why More Equity Financing When Stock Prices are High?", Working 
Paper, University of Michigan, Department of Economics, 1987. 
7. Ballon, Robert J.，and Iwao Tomita, The Financial Behaviour of Japanese 
Corporations. Kodansha International, Tokyo and New York, 1988. 
8. Bhattacharya, S.，"Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the "Bird in the 
Hand" Fallacy", Hell Journal ofEconoimcs 10, 1979，pp.225-235. 
9 Bradley Michael, Gregg Jarrell, and E. Han Kim, “On the Existence of an Optimal 
Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence", Journal of Finance，39, 1984，pp.857-
878. 
lO.Bulow，Jeremy and John Shoven, "The Bankruptcy Decision", Bell Journal of 
Econokcs 9’ 1978，pp.437-456. 
11 Cable John and Paul Turner, "Asymmetric Information and Credit Rationing: 
Another View of Industrial Bank Lending and Britain's Economic Problems , mD. 
Currie (Ed ) , — 鹏 in Monetary Economics, ESRC Money Study Group, 1985. 
12. Caves, R And M. Uekusa, Ma§lligLQlganization in Japan, Brookings Institution, 
1976, 
13. Chaplinsky, Susan, and Greg Niehaus, "The Determinants of Inside Ownership and 
Leverage，，，Working Paper, University of Michigan, 1990. 
86 
14. Chiarella, Carl, loan M. Pham, Ah Boon Sim, and Madeleine M L. Tan, 
'T)eterminants of Corporate Capital Structure: Australian Evidence", in Rhee, S.G., 
and Chang R. P. (Ed), Pacific Basin Capital Markets Research, Vol. 111，1992， 
pp. 139-158. 
15. Crutchley, C.E., and R.S. Hansen, "A Test of Agency Theory of Managerial 
Ownership, Corporate Leverage and Corporate Dividends", Financial Management, 
Winter 1989，pp.36-46. 
16. Cutler, David, and Lawrence Summers, "The Costs of Conflict Resolution and 
Financial Distress: Evidence from Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation", Rand Journal of 
Economics. 19，1988，pp. 157-172. 
17. DeAngelo, H.，and R.W. Masulis，"Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and 
Personal Taxation", Journal of Finance 8, 1980，pp.3-29. 
18. Diamond, D.，'Tinancial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring", Review of 
Economic Studies, 51, 1984，pp.393-414. 
19. Dotan, A., and S.A. Ravid, "On the Real and Financial Decisions of a Firm under 
Uncertainty", Journal of Finance ,40, 1985，pp.501-517. 
20. Elston, C D., "The Financing of Japanese Industry", Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletia December 1981，pp.510-518. 
91 Fmnomic Statistics Annual Bank of Japan, 1993 issue. 
22. Fama, Eugene F., and Merton H. Miller, The Theory of Finance. Holt, Rinehart， 
and Winston, New York, 1972. 
23. Feni, M.G., and W.H. Jones, 'T)eterminants of Financial Structure: A New 
Methodological Approach", Journal of Finance, 34，1979，pp.631-644. 
24 Frankel Jeffrey A.，"Japanese Finance in the 1980，s: A Survey", in Paul Krugman 
(Ed.)，Trade with Japan. National Bureau of Economic Research, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1991. 
25. Friend, I., and J. Hasbrouck, "Determinants of Capital Structure", Research in 
Finance 7, 1988, pp. 1-19. 
26 Gertner, Robert，and David Scharfstein, "A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of 
Reorganization Law", Working paper. University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 1989. 
87 
27. Gordon, M.J.，The Investment. Financing, and Valuation of the Corporation, 
Homewood, EL，Irwin, 1962. 
28. Goto，Takeshi, "Bond Market: Current Situation and Legal Aspects", in Lectures 
on Japanese Securities Regulations. Tokyo, Japan Securities Research Institute, 
1980. 
29. Grossman, Sanford J.，and Oliver Hart, "Corporate Financial Structure and 
Managerial Incentives", in J. McCall (Ed ), The Economics of Tnformation and 
Uncertainty. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982. 
30. Hadley, Eleanor, "Counterpoint on Business Grouping and Government-Industry 
Relations in Automobiles”，in Aoki, M. (Ed)，The Economic Analysis of Japanese 
Firm. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., North-Holland, 1984, pp.319-327. 
31 . , Antitrust in Japan. Princeton University Press, Princeton，NJ， 
1970. 
32. Hodder, J.E., "Corporate Capital Structure in the United States and Japan: Financial 
Intermediation and Implications of Financial Deregulation", in J.B. Shoven (Ed.)， 
Government Policy Towards Industry in the United States and Japan, New York， 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
33 , "Is the Cost of Capital Lower in Japan?", Journal of the Japanese and 
j Tntemational Economies. March 1991，pp.86-100. 
34. Hodder，IE. and A.E Tschoegl, "Some Aspects of Japanese Corporate Finance，，， 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20, 1985，pp. 173-191. 
35 , "Corporate Finance in Japan，，，in Shinji Takagi 
(TRH) T 〒磁 e Capital Markets - New Developments in Regulations and Institutions, 
Blacicwell, O x f o r d UK & Cambridge US A^  1993. 
36 Hoshi Takeo, Anil Kashyap，and David Scharfstein, "The Role of Banks in 
Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan", Journal of Financial Economics 
27, 1990, pp.67-88. 
37 ， M o n i t o r i n g and 
Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking 
Relationships", in R.G. Hubbard (Ed), Assonmetrir Tnformation. Corporate Finance 
and Investment. University of Chicago Press, 1990，pp. 105-126. 
Industrial Groupings in Japan - Thi. Anatomy of the "Kdretsu：, Dodwell Marketing 
Consultants, Tenth Edition, 1992/93. 
88 
I 
39. Japan Company Handbook. Nihon Keizai Shimbun Inc., various issues. 
40. Jensen, M C.，"Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers", American Economic Review. 76, 1986，pp.323-339. 
41. Jensen，M.C., and W.H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Capital Structure", Journal of Financial Economics 3, 1976， 
pp.305-360. 
42. John, K., and J. Williams, "Dividends, Dilutions and Taxes: Signalling 
Equilibrium’，，Journal of Finance 40, 1985，pp. 1053-70. 
43. Judge, G.G., W.E. Griffiths, RC Hill, H. Lutkepohl, and T.C. Lee，The Theory 
and Practice of Econometrics. 2nd Edition, New York, Wiley, 1985. 
44. Keiretsu no Kenkvu (Studies on Financial Corporate Groupings), Keizai Chosa 
Kyokai, Tokyo (Annual Publication). 
45. Kim, Sun Bae，"The Use of Equity Position by Banks: The Japanese Evidence", 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review. Fall 1991，pp.41-55. 
46. Long，Michael, and Ileen Malitz, "The Investment-Financing Nexus: Some 
Empirical Evidence", Midland Corporate Finance Journal. 3，1985, pp.53-59. 
47. Mackie-Mason, Jeffrey K, 'T)o Firms Care Who Provides Their Financing?", in R.G. 
Hubbard (Ed), Asymmetric Information. Corporate Finance and Investment， 
University of Chicago Press, 1990，pp.307-332. 
48. Marsh, P., "The Choice between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study", Journal of 
Finance. 37, 1982, pp. 121-144. 
49. Masulis, Ronald W., "The Impact of Capital Structure Change on Firm Value: Some 
Estimates", Journal of Finance. 38，1983，pp. 107-126. 
50. Masulis, Ronald W.，and Ashok N. Korwar, “Seasoned Equity Offerings: An 
Empirical Investigation", Journal of Financial Economics, 15, pp.91-118. 
51 Mayer， Colin, "Financial Systems， Corporate Finance， and Economic 
Development", in R.G. Hubbard (Ed), Asymmetric Information. Corporate Finance 
and Investment. University of Chicago Press, 1990，pp.307-332. 
89 
52. Meerschwan, David M., "The Japanese Financial System and the Cost of Capital", in 
Paul Kmgman (Ed ), Trade with Japan. National Bureau of Economic Research, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
53. Mikkelson, Wayne H.， a n d M. Megan Partch, "Valuation Effects of Security 
Offerings and the Issuance Process”，Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 1986， 
pp.31-69. 
54. Miller, Mertoti H.，"Debt and Taxes", Journal of Finance. 32, May 1977, pp.261-
275. 
55. Miller, M. And K. Rock, 'T)ividend Policy under Asymmetric Information", Journal 
of Finance 40. 1985，pp . 1031-51. 
56. Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance, and the Theory of Investment", American Economic Review. 3，June 1958, 
pp.261-297. 
57 . ，"Corporate Income Taxes and the 
Pricft Capital A rorrection". American Economic Review. 3，June 1963, 
pp.433-443. 
58. Myers, Stewart C., "The Search for Optimal Capital Structure", Midland Corporate 
Finance Journal 1，Spring 1983，pp.6-16. 
： 
59 "Capital Structure Puzzle", Journal of Finance, 3, July 1984, 
pp.575-592. ， 
60. Myers，Stewart C.，and N. Majluf，"Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information Investors Do Not Have”，Journal of Financial 
Economics. 13，1984, pp.187-221. 
61. Nagatani, I,，"The Economic Role of Corporate Financial Grouping", in Aoki, M. 
(Ed), The Economic Analysis of Japanese Firm, Elsevier Science Publishers B V.， 
North-Holland, 1984, pp.227-258. 
(a OECD Economic Survey on Japan, 1989/90 issue. 
63 OECD Financial Statistics Part Non-fipancial Enterprises' Financial Statements, 
various issues. 
64. Pascale, Richard and Thomas P. Rohlen, “The Mazda Turnaround" Journal of 
Japanese Studies. 9, 1983, pp.219-263. 
90 
65. Riley, J.G., "Informational EquiUbrium", Econometrica. 47, 1979, pp.331-359. 
66. Rosembluth, Frances, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan, Cornell University 
Press, NY, 1989. 
67. Ross，Stephen, "The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling 
Approach", Bell Journal of Economics. 8, 1977, pp.23-40. 
68. Sheard, P., "The Main Bank System and the Corporate Monitoring and Control in 
Japan", Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 11, 1989，pp.399-422. 
69. Smith, C , and J. Warner, "On Financial Contracting", Journal of Financial 
Economics 7, 1979，pp. 117-161. 
70. Solow, Robert M.，"A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. February 1956，pp.65-94. 
71. Spence, A.M., Market Signalling. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974. 
72. Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss, "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information", 
American Economic Review, 71, 1981，pp.393-410. 
73. Suzuki, S, and Richard W. Wright, 'Tinancial Structure and Bankruptcy Risk in 
Japanese Companies", Journal of International Business Studies, Spring 1985， 
pp.97-110. 
74. Suzuki, Yoshio, The Japanese Financial System. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990. 
75. Taggart, Jr.，Robert A.，"Secular Patterns in the Financing of U.S. Corporations", in 
B. Friedman (Ed.)，Corporate Capital Structure in the United States. University of 
Chicago Press, 1985. 
76. Takashi, i^”hni�Rnsiness Practices and Taxation in Japan. The Japan Times Ltd., 
1991.‘ 
77. Tatewaki, Kazuo, Ranking and Finance in Japan - An Introduction to the Tokyo 
Market, Routledge，London and New York, 1991. 
78. Titman, Sheridan and Robert Wessels, "The Determinants of Capital Structure 
Choice", Journal of Finance. 43, 1984，pp. 1-19. 
79. Warner, Jerold, ''Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence", Journal of Finance 32, 1977， 
pp.337-347. 
91 
80. Watts, R.L.，and J.L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1986. 
81. Weiss, Lawrence A., "Bankmptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority 
Claims", Journal of Financial Economics TL 1990. 
82. Williamson, O.，The Economic Institutions of Capitalism- Free Press, New York， 
1985. 
83. Yamamoto, Shigeru, "The Japanese Bond Market", in Shinji Takagi (Ed), Japanese 
Capital Markets - New Developments in Regulations and Institutions, Blackwell, 




 _ ： 一
 I a i s 
權 ： ： ： ： ： ： _ 
i ? . .
 . . . : :
 .」.、•





 广 i 







 ； ” s 鐘 
\
 -
 " - s i 












































 ： ” .
 .
 4


















































 ’ 二 
- i p







: . . 、 ” £ 




















 r ^ i 
F




















 : , : 、 ， ： 、 ：
 A
 -













 I v - r 
？
 ,
 I t f l f l i ; . . ' .
 、 ‘ ？ ， : ? ,
 ^
 I
 . . . . 条 — • [ . 场 i . , ,
 — 1 4 4 3 . i g g i a g V 
— I 




i l • c i 
. J 
. 一
 6
 -
